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This study examined privacy legislation in California to identify those electronic Protected 
Health Information (e-PHI) privacy policies that are suited to seniors using in-home health 
monitoring systems. Personal freedom and independence are essential to a person's physical and 
mental health, and mobile technology applications provide a convenient and economical method 
for monitoring personal health. Many of these apps are written by third parties, however, which 
poses serious risks to patient privacy. Current federal regulations only cover applications and 
systems developed for use by covered entities and their business partners. As a result, the 
responsibility for protecting the privacy of the individual using health monitoring apps obtained 
from the open market falls squarely on the states.  
The goal of this study was to conduct an exploratory study of existing legislation to learn what 
was being done at the legislative level to protect the security and privacy of users using in-home 
mobile health monitoring systems. Specifically, those developed and maintained by 
organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). The researcher chose California due to its 
reputation for groundbreaking privacy laws and high population of seniors.  
The researcher conducted a content analysis of California state legislation, federal and industry 
best practices, and extant literature to identify current and proposed legislation regarding the 
protection of e-PHI data of those using in-home health monitoring systems.  
The results revealed that in-home health monitoring systems show promise, but they are not 
without risk. The use of smartphones, home networks, and downloadable apps puts patient 
privacy at risk, and combining systems that were not initially intended to function together 
carries additional concerns. Factors such as different privacy-protection profiles, opt-in/opt-out 
defaults, and privacy policies that are difficult to read or are not adhered to by the application 
also put user data at risk.  
 
  Robert L. Saganich 
While this examination showed that there is legislative support governing the development of the 
technology of individual components of the in-home health monitoring systems, it appears that 
the in-home health monitoring system as a whole is an immature technology and not in wide 
enough use to warrant legislative attention. In addition – unlike the challenges posed by the 
development and maintenance of the technology of in-home health monitoring systems – there is 
ample legislation to protect user privacy in mobile in-home health monitoring systems developed 
and maintained by those not classified as covered entities under HIPAA. Indeed, the volume of 
privacy law covering the individual components of the system is sufficient to ensure that the 
privacy of the system as a whole would not be compromised if deployed as suggested in this 
study. Furthermore, the legislation evaluated over the course of this study demonstrated 
consistent balance between technical, theoretical, and legal stakeholders. 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in this area by conducting an in-depth review of 
current and proposed legislation in the state of California for the past five years. The results will 
help provide future direction for researchers and developers as they struggle to meet the current 
and future needs of patients using this technology as it matures. There are practical applications 
for this study as well. The seven themes identified during this study can serve as a valuable 
starting point for state legislators to evaluate existing and proposed legislation within the context 
of medical data to identify the need for legislation to assist in protecting user data against fraud, 
identity theft, and other damaging consequences that occur because of a data breach.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background 
     An increase in human life expectancy has resulted in a significant population of seniors 
(Ghose et al., 2013; Vuorimaa, Harmo, Hämäläinen, Itälä, & Miettinen, 2012). The World 
Health Organization predicts that the population of persons aged over 60 will grow from the 
current 650 million to over 2 billion by the year 2050 (Vuorimaa et al., 2012). Demands on 
personal caregivers and family members will increase as well, as current healthcare technology 
remains mainly limited to hospital, assisted living facilities, and hospice care. As healthcare costs 
skyrocket and resources become depleted, researchers are calling for the development of a new 
healthcare model that better addresses these concerns (Dickerson, Gorlin, & Stankovic, 2011; 
Vuorimaa et al., 2012). Extant literature shows that seniors prefer living at home rather than in a 
care facility (Vuorimaa et al., 2012). Medical monitoring and detection within the home would 
enhance the quality of life of the seniors and their families, and reduce the financial burden on 
the healthcare system (Alcalá, Parson, & Rogers, 2015; Dickerson et al., 2011; Sun, Fang, & 
Zhu, 2010; Vuorimaa et al., 2012). Personal freedom and independence are essential to a 
person's physical and mental health, and people of all ages are using mobile technology. mHealth 
applications are on the rise as well (Armontrout, Torous, Fisher, Drogin, & Gutheil, 2016). The 
IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics reported in September 2015 that there were over 
165,000 mHealth apps on the market, and the 2014 Health Information National Trends Survey 
reported 36% of adults had mHealth apps on their smartphones/tablets (Brzan, Rotman, 
Pajnkihar, & Klanjsek, 2016). As healthcare costs rise and healthcare infrastructure becomes 
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overburdened because of the population growth, it is imperative that mobile technologies 
continue to be leveraged to assist in independent living and in-home health monitoring of senior 
patients (Díaz-Bossini & Moreno, 2014; Reeder, Demiris, & Thompson, 2015). It is important, 
however, that the protection of patient data not be overlooked in the interest of technological 
advancement (Armontrout et al., 2016; Martínez-Pérez, de la Torre-Díez, & López-Coronado, 
2014). The storage, forwarding, and access to personal health information of patients by 
unregulated third parties presents a massive potential for privacy loss for patients – and possibly 
family members and medical personnel, depending on how much information the database 
retains about a patient's relationships. Current federal regulations only cover applications and 
systems developed for use by covered entities and their business partners (Paul & Irvine, 2014; 
Yang & Silverman, 2014). As a result, the responsibility for protecting the privacy of the 
individual using health monitoring apps obtained from the open market falls squarely on the 
states.  
 
Problem Statement 
     More work is needed to protect the privacy of users' data that mobile applications collect, 
store, and transmit (Brzan et al., 2016; Martínez-Pérez et al., 2014; Varshney, 2014; Yang & 
Silverman, 2014). In particular, in-home health monitoring systems developed by individuals or 
organizations that existing federal regulations do not define as covered entities.  
     This study was originally designed as a two-state case study consisting of California, due to 
its reputation for groundbreaking privacy laws (Lovells, 2013; Willcox, 2017) and high 
population of seniors (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014); and Florida, because of the high percentage of 
seniors relative to the overall state population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). However, the 
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researcher was unable to obtain sufficient data on the state of Florida and had to change the study 
to a single-state case study consisting of California only. 
 
Dissertation Goal  
     The goal of this study was to conduct an exploratory study of existing legislation to learn 
what was being done at the legislative level to protect the security and privacy of users using in-
home mobile health monitoring systems. Specifically, those developed and maintained by 
organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).  
  
Research questions 
     The main research question of this work was – what was the California state legislature doing 
to protect the security and privacy of users of in-home mobile health monitoring systems? 
Specifically, those developed and maintained by organizations or individuals not classified as 
covered entities under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA)?  
RQ 1: What legislation did California have in place governing the development and maintenance 
of the technology used with mobile in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained 
by organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities under HIPAA? 
RQ2: What legislation did California have in place to protect the privacy of seniors using mobile 
in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained by organizations or individuals 
not classified as covered entities under HIPAA? 
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RQ3: What was the required technical and legal expertise California needed to develop and 
enforce such legislation? 
 
Relevance and Significance 
     Current literary guidance and regulations concerning privacy of mHealth applications is 
sparse and confusing, and researchers and clinicians alike are calling for more standardized 
guidance to enable developers, clinicians, and users to better leverage mHealth technology while 
preserving privacy and adhering to legal requirements (Armontrout et al., 2016; Health 
Information & the Law, 2016a; Lewis & Wyatt, 2014). This work explored existing and 
proposed California state legislation to learn what was being done to protect the privacy of user 
data collected, stored, and transmitted by systems or applications developed by entities not 
covered under existing federal regulations. Specifically, it addressed the risks to seniors relying 
on in-home health monitoring systems to provide maintenance and early warning of health 
problems.  
     This work will add to the body of knowledge and provide future directions for researchers and 
developers as they struggle to meet the current and future needs of patients using this technology.  
  
Barriers and Issues 
     The researcher anticipated three major barriers in conducting this study. The first was 
determining whom to interview. State websites list the current heads of agencies and other 
offices, but the actual work to create the legislation may have been done by researchers and 
presented to the state legislature. The number of perspectives involved was likely to make the 
identification of a starting point difficult. The researcher chose California due to its reputation 
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for groundbreaking privacy laws (Lovells, 2013; Willcox, 2017) and high population of seniors 
(See figure 1 for population data) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). The researcher conducted the 
literature review with the authors of the recommendation reports and research, and from there to 
the legislators who sponsored the bills. 
     The second major barrier was the number of people required to speak with to obtain the data. 
It was highly likely that no one person will be able to answer all the questions. The process 
would likely involve a long chain of sources, which would be a laborious and costly process with 
no clear end. For instance, since regulations evolve, and new regulations take their place, there 
would come a point where it would only be possible to go back so far in time before the 
necessary sources had retired, moved on to other locations, or were otherwise no longer 
available. 
     The third major barrier was whether the sources could and would participate. There may be 
professional reasons such as regulatory or legal constraints that prohibited the release of certain 
information to outside sources. Also, data and personnel compartmentalization might require 
input from numerous sources to get a complete picture. This may have prevented the researcher 
from gaining access to the requested information due to security concerns. There may also have 
been personal issues with the individual; they may have been unwilling to cooperate for 
whatever reason. Lack of a third-party introduction would also be a major problem, particularly 
given the popularity of social engineering attacks masquerading as students doing research.  
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Figure 1. Population of seniors by state. 
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Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
     In addition to information readily available on the Internet, this study required access to 
recorded data stored in local libraries and government records. It was assumed that these 
resources would be available and remain available throughout this study.  
     The researcher would also need to interview members of the state privacy office, its 
equivalent, or state legislators – either in person or via telephone or the web – to obtain 
clarification of facts or to obtain information not found elsewhere. It was assumed that the 
individuals needed to interview would remain available throughout this study.  
     In any study involving human subjects, the researcher must assume they will be truthful 
(Terrell, 2016). In the case of this study, there may have been professional reasons such as 
security, regulatory, or legal constraints that prohibited the release of certain information to 
outside sources. There may also have been personal issues with the individual; they may have 
been unwilling to cooperate for whatever reason. The researcher assumed the sources were able 
and willing to provide their full cooperation and would be truthful in their response. 
Limitations 
     The researcher used the Internet to gather the information pertinent to this study. New 
regulations are introduced every day, but the data gathering portion of the study was time-
constrained.  
     The legislative process is ongoing, and there is often a good amount of turnover. As a result, 
it may only be possible to go back so far in time before the necessary sources have retired, 
moved on to other locations, or are otherwise no longer available. This could lead to an 
incomplete or inaccurate account of a piece of legislation. 
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Delimitations 
     This study focused on California due to its reputation for groundbreaking privacy laws 
(Lovells, 2013; Willcox, 2017) and because it has the highest population of seniors in the 
country (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014).   
     This study was originally designed to examine legislation by gathering data obtained from 
both the state legislative websites and interviews with legislators involved in the legislation 
identified during the legislative search. This study originally included the state of Florida 
because it has the highest population of seniors relative to the overall population (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2014). However, the Florida legislative website provided limited data relevant to this 
study, and the researcher was unable to locate a sufficient number of participants to interview. 
As a result, the researcher had to discard the data for Florida and change the study to a single-
state case study focusing on California only. While the California legislative website provided an 
abundance of data, only two of the original respondents actually participated in the survey. This 
did not provide a sufficient sample size of participants to accurately represent the legislative 
body of California, and so the survey and interview data was discarded. The discarded data from 
the study (Instrument development and validation, Data analysis, Survey results, and 
Implications) are included in Appendix C. 
     The exclusion of the survey and interview data left only the data collected online, which is not 
suitable for a case study (Terrell, 2016). However, the data from the California legislative web 
site proved sufficient to address the research questions in this study on its own. In this case a 
content analysis is appropriate (Terrell, 2016), and so the researcher changed the study once 
again. 
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Definitions of Terms 
Availability – Data is accessible and usable when needed (Medicare learning network, 2016). 
Access – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines access as “to gain entry to, instruct, cause input to, 
cause output from, cause data processing with, or communicate with, the logical, arithmetical, or 
memory function resources of a computer, computer system, or computer network” (p. 2). 
Aggregate consumer information – California S.B 1121 (2018) defines aggregate consumer 
information as: 
information that relates to a group or category of consumers, from which individual 
consumer identities have been removed, that is not linked or reasonably linkable to any 
consumer or household, including via a device. “Aggregate consumer information” does 
not mean one or more individual consumer records that have been deidentified. (p. 10)  
 
California A.B. 375 (2018) discusses aggregate consumer information as well. The definition is 
the same as that listed here. 
Authentication – California A.B. 1906 defines authentication as “a method of verifying the 
authority of a user, process, or device to access resources in an information system” (p. 2). 
Behavioral tracking – The practice of collecting information about a user while they are using 
an application. Examples include personal data, browsing and purchase history, internet 
searches, ads a user clicks on or closes, and which type of media a user prefers to view or listen 
to (Sonam & Shubhangini, 2014).  
Biometric information – California S.B. 1121 (2018) defines biometric information as: 
an individual’s physiological, biological or behavioral characteristics, including an 
individual’s deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), that can be used, singly or in combination 
with each other or with other identifying data, to establish individual identity. Biometric 
information includes, but is not limited to, imagery of the iris, retina, fingerprint, face, 
hand, palm, vein patterns, and voice recordings, from which an identifier template, such 
as a faceprint, a minutiae template, or a voiceprint, can be extracted, and keystroke 
patterns or rhythms, gait patterns or rhythms, and sleep, health, or exercise data that 
contain identifying information (p. 10). 
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Bot – California S.B. 1001 (2018) defines a bot as “an automated online account on an online 
platform that is designed to mimic or behave like the account of a person” (p. 2). 
Breach of the security of the system – California S.B. 570 (2015) defines breach of the security 
of the system as: 
unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security, 
confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by the agency. Good faith 
acquisition of personal information by an employee or agent of the agency for the 
purposes of the agency is not a breach of the security of the system, provided that the 
personal information is not used or subject to further unauthorized disclosure (p. 4). 
 
California A.B. 964 (2015) discusses breach of the security of the system as well. The definition 
is the same as that listed here. 
Caregiver – California A.B. 1744 (2014) defines caregiver as “any relative, partner, friend, or 
neighbor who has a significant relationship with, and who provides a broad range of assistance 
to, an older person or an adult with a chronic or disabling condition” (p. 2). California A.C.R. 38 
(2015) expands the definition of caregiver to include a spouse. 
Caretaker – California A.B. 1718 (2016) defines caretaker as “any person who has the care, 
custody, or control of, or who stands in a position of trust with, an elder or a dependent adult” (p. 
4). California A.B. 329 (2017) discusses caretakers as well. The definition is the same as that 
listed here. 
Cloud computing – Mell and Grance (2011) define cloud computing as “a model for enabling 
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction” (p. 2). 
Commercial health monitoring program – California A.B. 2688 (2016) defines a commercial 
health monitoring program as “a commercial Internet Web site, online service, or product used 
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by consumers whose primary purpose is to collect the consumer’s individually identifiable health 
monitoring information” (p. 3). 
Computer contaminant – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines computer contaminant as: 
any set of computer instructions that are designed to modify, damage, destroy, record, or 
transmit information within a computer, computer system, or computer network without 
the intent or permission of the owner of the information. They include, but are not limited 
to, a group of computer instructions commonly called viruses or worms, that are self-
replicating or self-propagating and are designed to contaminate other computer programs 
or computer data, consume computer resources, modify, destroy, record, or transmit data, 
or in some other fashion usurp the normal operation of the computer, computer system, or 
computer network (p. 3). 
 
Computer network – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines computer network as “any system that 
provides communications between one or more computer systems and input/output devices, 
including, but not limited to, display terminals, remote systems, mobile devices, and printers 
connected by telecommunication facilities” (p. 2). 
Computer program or software – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines computer program or 
software as “a set of instructions or statements, and related data, that when executed in actual or 
modified form, cause a computer, computer system, or computer network to perform specified 
functions” (p. 2). 
Computer services – according to California A.B. 32 (2015) computer services “includes, but is 
not limited to, computer time, data processing, or storage functions, Internet services, electronic 
mail services, electronic message services, or other uses of a computer, computer system, or 
computer network” (p. 2). 
Computer system – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines a computer system as: 
a device or collection of devices, including support devices and excluding calculators that 
are not programmable and capable of being used in conjunction with external files, one or 
more of which contain computer programs, electronic instructions, input data, and output 
data, that performs functions, including, but not limited to, logic, arithmetic, data storage 
and retrieval, communication, and control (p. 2). 
  
12 
 
Confidential communication – California A.B. 1671 (2016) defines confidential 
communication as: 
any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party 
to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a 
communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive, or 
administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the 
parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be 
overheard or recorded (p. 2). 
 
Confidentiality – Ensures data are only made available to authorized entities (Medicare learning 
network, 2016). 
Connected device – California A.B. 1906 (2018) defines connected device as “any device, or 
other physical object that is capable of connecting to the Internet, directly or indirectly, and that 
is assigned an Internet Protocol address or Bluetooth address” (p. 2). 
Data – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines data as: 
a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts, computer software, or 
computer programs or instructions. Data may be in any form, in storage media, or as 
stored in the memory of the computer or in transit or presented on a display device (p. 2).  
 
Data at rest – with respect to data on a smartphone, California A.B. 1681 (2016) defines data at 
rest as “data that is parked, stored, and no longer in motion, such as pictures and text messages” 
(p. 3). 
Data broker – California S.B. 1348 (2014) defines data broker as: 
a commercial entity that collects, assembles, or maintains personal information 
concerning individuals residing in California who are not customers or employees of that 
entity … for the purposes of selling or offering for sale, or other consideration, the 
personal information to a third party (p. 3). 
 
Deidentified – California S.B 1121 (2018) defines deidentified as: 
information that cannot reasonably identify, relate to, describe, be capable of being 
associated with, or be linked, directly or indirectly, to a particular consumer, provided that a 
business that uses deidentified information:  
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• Has implemented technical safeguards that prohibit reidentification of the consumer 
to whom the information may pertain.  
• Has implemented business processes that specifically prohibit reidentification of the 
information.  
• Has implemented business processes to prevent inadvertent release of deidentified 
information.  
• Makes no attempt to reidentify the information (p. 12).  
 
Dependent adult – California A.B. 1718 (2016) defines a dependent adult as: 
any person who is between the ages of 18 and 64, who has physical or mental limitations 
which restrict his or her ability to carry out normal activities or to protect his or her 
rights, including, but not limited to, persons who have physical or developmental 
disabilities or whose physical or mental abilities have diminished because of age. 
“Dependent adult” includes any person between the ages of 18 and 64 who is admitted as 
an inpatient to a 24-hour health facility (p. 4).  
 
California A.B. 329 (2017) discusses dependent adults as well. The definition is the same as that 
listed here. 
Digital health feedback system – California A.B. 2167 (2018) defines digital health feedback 
system as:  
an ingestible sensor that collects or sends information about an individual, and is used in 
conjunction with either, or both, of the following:  
• A sensor or device placed inside or worn on the body that collects or sends 
information about an individual.  
• A software platform that is connected to the Internet, directly or indirectly, or to 
another device that receives and displays information collected or sent from a sensor 
or device as described in paragraph (1) (p. 3).  
 
Elder – California A.B. 1718 (2016) defines elder as “any person who is 65 years of age or 
older” (p. 4). California A.B. 329 (2017) discusses elders as well. The definition is the same as 
that listed here. 
Electronic means – California A.B. 695 (2015) defines electronic means to “include opening an 
email account or an account or profile on a social networking Internet Web site in another 
person’s name” (p. 2). 
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Electronic mail – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines electronic mail as: 
an electronic message or computer file that is transmitted between two or more 
telecommunications devices; computers; computer networks, regardless of whether the 
network is a local, regional, or global network; or electronic devices capable of receiving 
electronic messages, regardless of whether the message is converted to hard copy format 
after receipt, viewed upon transmission, or stored for later retrieval (p. 3). 
 
Encrypted – California A.B. 2828 (2016) defines encrypted as “rendered unusable, unreadable, 
or indecipherable to an unauthorized person through a security technology or methodology 
generally accepted in the field of information security” (p. 5). California A.B. 2182 (2018) and 
California A.B. 2678 (2018) use the same definition of encrypted as that listed here. 
Geolocation information – California A.B. 83 (2016) defines geolocation information as: 
location data generated by a consumer device capable of connecting to the Internet that 
directly identifies the precise physical location of the identified individual at particular 
times and that is compiled and retained. “Geolocation information” does not include the 
contents of a communication or information used solely for 911 emergency purposes (p. 
3). 
 
Government computer system – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines government computer 
system as “any computer system, or part thereof, that is owned, operated, or used by any federal, 
state, or local governmental entity” (p. 2). 
Health insurance information – California A.B. 2828 (2016) defines health insurance 
information as “an individual’s health insurance policy number or subscriber identification 
number, any unique identifier used by a health insurer to identify the individual, or any 
information in an individual’s application and claims history, including any appeals records” (p. 
5). California A.B. 2182 (2018) and California A.B. 2678 (2018) use the same definition of 
health insurance information as that listed here.  
Health monitoring information – California A.B. 2688 (2016) defines health monitoring 
information as: 
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information, in electronic or physical form, about a consumer’s mental or physical 
condition that is collected by a commercial health monitoring program through a direct 
measurement of a consumer’s mental or physical condition or though user-input 
regarding a consumer’s mental or physical condition into a commercial health monitoring 
program (p. 3). 
 
Homepage – California S.B 1121 (2018) defines homepage as: 
the introductory page of an Internet Web site and any Internet Web page where personal 
information is collected. In the case of an online service, such as a mobile application, 
homepage means the application’s platform page or download page, a link within the 
application, such as from the application configuration, “About,” “Information,” or 
settings page, and any other location that allows consumers to review [a required notice] 
before downloading the application (p. 13). 
  
Individually identifiable – California A.B. 2688 (2016) defines individually identifiable as: 
information that [sic] includes or contains an element of personal identifying information 
sufficient to allow identification of the consumer, including, but not limited to, the 
consumer’s name, address, electronic mail address, telephone number, social security 
number, or unique electronic identifier, or other information that, alone or in combination 
with other publicly available information, reveals the consumer’s identity (p. 4). 
 
Individually identifiable health information – The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines Individually 
identifiable health information as: 
Information that can either identify an individual or be reasonably believed to identify an 
individual. PHI falls into three categories: past, present or future physical or mental 
health or condition; details about the healthcare to the individual; or the past, present, or 
future payment for healthcare to the individual. Examples include name, address, birth 
date, and Social Security Number (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
2003, p. 4). 
 
Integrity – Ensures data is not destroyed or manipulated by other than authorized means or 
persons (Medicare learning network, 2016). 
Internet domain name – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines Internet domain name as “a globally 
unique, hierarchical reference to an Internet host or service, assigned through centralized Internet 
naming authorities, comprising a series of character strings separated by periods, with the 
rightmost character string specifying the top of the hierarchy” (p. 3). 
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Manufacturer – California A.B. 1906 defines manufacturer as: 
the person who manufactures, or contracts with another person to manufacture on the 
person’s behalf, connected devices that are sold or offered for sale in California. … a 
contract with another person to manufacture on the person’s behalf does not include a 
contract only to purchase a connected device, or only to purchase and brand a connected 
device (p. 3). 
 
Online – California S.B. 1001 (2018) defines online as “appearing on any public-facing Internet 
Web site, Web application, or digital application, including a social network or publication” (p. 
2). 
Online platform – California S.B. 1001 (2018) defines online platform as “any public-facing 
Internet Web site, Web application, or digital application, including a social network or 
publication” (p. 2). 
Operator – California S.B. 576 (2015) defines operator as: 
any person or entity that owns an Internet Web site or an online service, including a 
mobile application, that collects and maintains personally identifiable information from a 
consumer residing in California who uses or visits the Internet Web site or online service 
if the Internet Web site or online service is operated for commercial purposes. It does not 
include any third party that operates, hosts, or manages, but does not own, an Internet 
Web site or online service on the owner’s behalf or by processing information on behalf 
of the owner (p. 3). 
 
Privacy – California H.R. 10 (2017) defines privacy as “the recognition that a free and 
democratic society respects the autonomy of individuals to choose the circumstances and degree 
to which individuals will expose their personal characteristics, attitudes, and behavior” (p.1). 
Profile – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines profile to mean either: 
• A configuration of user data required by a computer so that the user may access programs 
or services and have the desired functionality on that computer. 
• An Internet Web site user’s personal page or section of a page that is made up of data, in 
text or graphical form, that displays significant, unique, or identifying information, 
including, but not limited to, listing acquaintances, interests, associations, activities, or 
personal statements (p. 3). 
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Protected Health Information (PHI) – The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines Protected Health 
Information (PHI) as “’individually identifiable health information’ held or transmitted by a 
covered entity or its business associate, in any form or media, whether electronic, paper, or oral” 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2003, p. 3).  
Public safety infrastructure computer system – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines public 
safety infrastructure computer system as: 
any computer system, or part thereof, that is necessary for the health and safety of the 
public including computer systems owned, operated, or used by drinking water and 
wastewater treatment facilities, hospitals, emergency service providers, 
telecommunication companies, and gas and electric utility companies (p.2). 
 
Ransomware – California S.B. 1137 (2016) defines ransomware as: 
a computer contaminant … or lock placed or introduced without authorization into a 
computer, computer system, or computer network that restricts access by an authorized 
person to the computer, computer system, computer network, or any data therein under 
circumstances in which the person responsible for the placement or introduction of the 
ransomware demands payment of money or other consideration to remove the computer 
contaminant, restore access to the computer, computer system, computer network, or 
data, or otherwise remediate the impact of the computer contaminant or lock (p. 2). 
 
Security feature – California A.B. 1906 defines security feature as “a feature of a device 
designed to provide security for that device” (p. 2). 
Smartphone – California S.B. 962 defines smartphone as: 
a cellular radio telephone or other mobile voice communications handset device that includes 
all of the following features: 
• Utilizes a mobile operating system. 
• Possesses the capability to utilize mobile software applications, access and browse the 
Internet, utilize text messaging, utilize digital voice service, and send and receive email. 
• Has wireless network connectivity. 
• Is capable of operating on a long-term evolution network or successor wireless data 
network communication standards (p. 2). 
 
Social media – California A.B. 1671 (2016) defines social media as “an electronic service or 
account, or electronic content, including, but not limited to, videos or still photographs, blogs, 
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video blogs, podcasts, instant and text messages, email, online services or accounts, or Internet 
Web site profiles or locations” (p. 3). 
Sold in California – according to California S.B. 962, sold in California: 
or any variation thereof, means that the smartphone is sold at retail from a location within 
the state, or the smartphone is sold and shipped to an end-use consumer at an address 
within the state. “Sold in California” does not include a smartphone that is resold in the 
state on the secondhand market or that is consigned and held as collateral on a loan (p. 2). 
 
Supporting documentation – according to California A.B. 32 (2015), supporting 
documentation: 
includes, but is not limited to, all information, in any form, pertaining to the design, 
construction, classification, implementation, use, or modification of a computer, 
computer system, computer network, computer program, or computer software, which 
information is not generally available to the public and is necessary for the operation of a 
computer, computer system, computer network, computer program, or computer software 
(p. 2). 
 
Trusted system – California A.B. 22 (2017) defines a trusted system as “a combination of 
technologies, policies, and procedures for which there is no plausible scenario in which a 
document retrieved from or reproduced by the system could differ substantially from the 
document that is originally stored” (p. 2). California A.B. 2225 (2018) modifies this definition to 
change “document” to “public record” (p. 4). 
Unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure – California A.B. 2167 
(2018) defines unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure as “access, 
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure that is not authorized by the person about whom the 
information pertains unless the access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure is authorized 
or required by law” (p. 7).  
Victim expenditure – California A.B. 32 (2015) defines victim expenditure as “any expenditure 
reasonably and necessarily incurred by the owner or lessee to verify that a computer system, 
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computer network, computer program, or data was or was not altered, deleted, damaged, or 
destroyed by the access” (p. 3). 
 
List of Acronyms 
ADHD  Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
BSN   Body Sensor Network 
COTS   Commercial off-the-shelf 
ECG   Electrocardiogram 
EEG   Electroencephalogram 
EMG   Electromyogram 
Empath  Emotional Monitoring for PATHology 
e-PHI   electronic Protected Health Information 
GSR   Galvanic Skin Response 
HIPAA  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
HITECH Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health 
IRB   Institutional Review Board 
LED   Light-Emitting Diode 
mHealth  Mobile Health 
PHI   Protected Health Information 
PII   Personally identifiable information 
SDK   Software Development Kit 
TOS   Terms of Service 
UbiHeld  Ubiquitous Healthcare for the Elderly 
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Summary 
     People are living longer, and the impact on our healthcare infrastructure is becoming critical 
(Dickerson et al., 2011; Vuorimaa et al., 2012). As healthcare costs skyrocket and resources 
become depleted, researchers are calling for a new way to care for the needs of the aging 
population (Reeder et al., 2015; Vuorimaa et al., 2012). Medical monitoring and detection within 
the home would enhance the quality of life of seniors and their families and reduce the financial 
burden on the healthcare system (Alcalá et al., 2015; Dickerson et al., 2011; Sun et al., 2010; 
Vuorimaa et al., 2012). Personal freedom and independence are essential to a person's physical 
and mental health, and mobile technology applications provide a convenient and economical 
method for monitoring personal health. Many of these apps are written by third parties, however, 
which poses serious risks to patient privacy. Current federal regulations only cover applications 
and systems developed for use by covered entities and their business partners. As a result, the 
responsibility for protecting the privacy of the individual using health monitoring apps obtained 
from the open market falls squarely on the states. The goal of this study was to conduct an 
exploratory study of existing legislation to learn what was being done at the legislative level to 
protect the security and privacy of users using in-home mobile health monitoring systems. 
Specifically, those developed and maintained by organizations or individuals not classified as 
covered entities under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).  
     This study was originally designed as a two-state case study consisting of California and 
Florida. The Florida legislative website provided limited data relevant to this study, and the 
researcher was unable to locate a sufficient number of participants to interview. As a result, the 
researcher had to discard the data for Florida and change the study to a single-state case study 
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focusing on California only. While the California legislative website provided an abundance of 
data, only two of the original respondents actually participated in the survey. This did not 
provide a sufficient sample size of participants, and so the survey and interview data were 
discarded (see Appendix C). As a result, the researcher had to abandon the case study approach 
in favor of the exploratory study consisting of California legislation.    
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
     Six themes emerged during the review of the literature: the evolution of patient monitoring 
systems; privacy issues associated with in-home monitoring systems; patient vulnerability and 
trust; current federal regulations and regulatory bodies; misinterpretation of regulations; and 
existing state legislation regarding the protection of medical data. A literature review section on 
each topic follows. 
The evolution of patient monitoring systems 
     The earliest and most resilient patient monitoring system is the Body Sensor Network (BSN). 
These systems consist of tiny sensors worn on or implanted in the patient’s body. These sensors 
gather information about the patient's current physical health and transmit it to a provider or 
other entity (Caldeira, Rodrigues, & Lorenz, 2012; Shu-Di, Yuan-Ting, & Lian-Feng, 2005; Sun 
et al., 2010). Many applications within the healthcare industry use these systems. BSNs in 
hospitals and other live-in facilities provide real-time patient information to medical staff 
(Caldeira et al., 2012). Also, both COTS and proprietary solutions are used to detect falls, 
monitor physical and neurological activity, and track physiological data such as heart activity 
and blood oxygenation (Calhoun et al., 2012).  BSNs also help medication regiments by 
controlling insulin pumps and dispensing medications (Calhoun et al., 2012; Hanson et al., 
2009). BSNs are being used to control prosthetic devices and providing sensory stimulation for 
the hearing or visually impaired (Calhoun et al., 2012). BSNs can be so small that they can be 
implanted into the eye – as in the intraocular pressure sensor for glaucoma treatment, or 
embedded into a contact lens to monitor glucose levels in diabetic patients (Calhoun et al., 2012). 
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     The value of BSNs in the home health-monitoring environment is undeniable (Calhoun et al., 
2012; Sun et al., 2010). However, these systems are highly specialized, and this brings 
drawbacks and disadvantages. For instance, the costs associated with regulatory compliance, 
development, manufacturing, marketing, and training can quickly add up (Hanson et al., 2009). 
Companies would either have to mass-produce a system designed to a single application or 
develop less-specialized systems to permit cross-application compatibility (Hanson et al., 2009).  
     As the patient monitoring industry grew, manufacturers and researchers began to explore the 
possibility of leveraging existing technology such as smartphones to build their systems. Lee et 
al. (2015) developed an in-home system for tracking a user's location using only a smartphone 
and a smartwatch. They reasoned that since users do not always carry their smartphone while 
they are in their home, the microphone and inertial sensors on the smart watch could be used to 
generate what they called "activity fingerprints," which could then be used to estimate the user's 
location in the house. The advantage of the system was that it eliminates the need for additional 
infrastructure, sensors, and user training that in-home tracking systems often require. The 
UbiHeld system developed by Ghose et al. (2013) leveraged multiple existing technologies to 
create their system for monitoring the physical and mental well-being of seniors. Multiple 
Microsoft Kinect systems deployed throughout the home provided skeletal tracking of the user, 
while social media activity provided a perspective of the user’s mental state. The data was 
transferred and stored on a backend server for storage and processing. A key benefit of this 
system was the skeletal tracking afforded by the Microsoft Kinect systems did not compromise 
the user's privacy since there was no actual video or image of the user. Dickerson et al. (2011) 
developed a system called Empath to monitor symptoms of depressive episodes. Their system 
used a variety of components: a central Web server/database, independent tri-axis accelerometers 
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attached to the patient's bed to monitor sleep patterns, a wireless body weight scale to monitor 
symptoms of changing eating habits, motion detectors and door/window contact switches to 
detect movement within the house, and a microphone attached to a touchscreen device to 
monitor speech patterns. The system transmitted the data to the Web server, which ran all 
analysis routines at preset intervals. The authors cited research estimating that over 15% of 
seniors had depressive episodes and posited that the effects of living alone longer due to 
technological advancements would exacerbate this problem. They proposed future research using 
seniors living alone as a target group. Alcala et al. (2015) analyzed data from smart electricity 
meters to identify a patient's activities by evaluating the electricity usage of an appliance. They 
tested the usage of a kettle in 13 UK homes to see if their algorithm could successfully detect 
usage patterns. They found their system successfully detected usage over 80% of the time with 
less than 10% false positives. Considering these results, they plan to expand their system to 
identify other appliances in use and to expand the research to include other countries where such 
technology is viable.  
     As the potential applications of in-home monitoring systems continued to grow, people began 
to realize the need to cut down on cost, user training, and expensive and specialized support 
requirements. Given the success of earlier systems in leveraging existing technology (Lee et al., 
2015), researchers began to evaluate existing products never intended for medical applications, 
such as gaming systems. These systems had become so advanced over the years that they had 
much of the technology and sensors already built into them. 
     Dhillon, Ramos, Wünsche, and Lutteroth (2012) examined four such popular devices for their 
potential application to the health monitoring industry. The first device was the Nintendo Wii 
remote — the main controller for Nintendo's Wii console. It features motion-sensing ability, a 
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three-axis accelerometer, a high-resolution/high-speed infrared camera, and Bluetooth 
connectivity. The device provides audio, visual, and tactile feedback to the user via speakers, 
vibration, and LEDs. While initially intended for gaming applications, this device has already 
seen success in health monitoring and physical rehabilitation scenarios where the device was 
physically attached to the patients. The main drawback to this approach was discomfort or 
disruption to the user's daily routine.  
     The second device examined was the Sony PlayStation Move — the controller for Sony's PS3 
console. It offers a three-axis gyroscope, a three-axis accelerometer, a terrestrial magnetic field 
sensor, vibration feedback, and Bluetooth connectivity. An SDK called "Move.me" provides the 
ability to write custom code. Unlike other systems, however, the device and computer must be 
plugged into the console. While the higher precision of the system is useful for games, it could 
cause frustration for users in medical applications because small gestures such as tremors or 
shaking could be captured and interpreted as input by the system. Also, a properly lit 
environment is required for the device to work; if the room is too dark, it will cause reflections 
on the screen. If it is too bright, the camera can have problems picking up images. 
     The third device was the Webcam. Webcams can provide an efficient and cost-effective 
method for maintaining communications between patients and healthcare professionals. 
Webcams come as standard equipment on many desktop and laptop computers, and external 
Webcams can be purchased relatively inexpensively and connected to the computer if it does not 
have one via USB connection. Studies have shown that some patients find this medium 
preferable because it delivers the doctor/patient interaction experience without the distractions of 
the office setting or the inconvenience of having to travel to the office. This type of medium can 
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also prove helpful for patients who are working through social phobias since there is no contact 
with other persons and situations that would cause them anxiety. 
     The last device was Microsoft’s Kinect — the input device for the Microsoft Xbox 360. The 
user interacts with the console via voice, gestures, and body movements. The device contains a 
Webcam, an infrared laser, a sensor system, and a microphone. The SDK provides for detection 
of human outlines, skeletal tracking, and facial recognition. The device connects directly to the 
computer via USB, so no special connections are required. The only drawback is the requirement 
for a well-lit and unobstructed environment, which could prove troublesome in a small apartment 
or cramped space. The Kinect has proven beneficial in physical rehabilitation scenarios because 
the user is not required to wear sensors or stand or sit in a fixed position, which makes it ideal for 
patients in wheelchairs. The motion-tracking feature has also proven useful in studies involving 
patients with ADHD and autism.  
Privacy issues associated with in-home monitoring systems 
     In-home health monitoring systems allow seniors to enjoy a higher quality of life by living 
longer in their homes. In the past, specialized companies dedicated solely to the healthcare 
industry were the only source for these systems. Today’s systems use smartphones, home 
wireless networks, and downloadable apps to collect, store, and transmit patient status and data 
to family members, private caregivers, and medical professionals in real-time (Jiya, 2016; Paul & 
Irvine, 2014). While these systems provide an efficient and effective method for monitoring the 
patient status and alerting healthcare professionals and family members, they may also put the 
patient privacy at risk (Al Ameen, Liu, & Kwak, 2012; Avancha, Baxi, & Kotz, 2012; Jiya, 
2016). These applications are developed and marketed in the global market, which is largely 
unregulated. Patient data could be stored anywhere, retained forever, and shared or sold at the 
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will of the app owner. Indeed, Paul and Irvine (2014) found such statements explicitly stated in 
the privacy and user agreements in several popular health monitoring services.  
     Health apps and systems can pose significant threats to patient privacy. Of particular concern 
is the compromise of patient information caused by the interaction of dissimilar systems with 
incompatible privacy protection profiles (Calhoun et al., 2012). Because these systems collect 
data from so many different sources it may seem harmless but each source has a different privacy 
policy or protection profile, and the combination of the data could exceed the privacy protection 
afforded by the application (Ammar, Malik, Rezgui, & Alodib, 2014). Still another concern is 
default opt-in/opt-out settings, which are often framed by the developer to permit sharing of user 
information by defaulting to "yes" (Bellman, Johnson, & Lohse, 2001).  
     Privacy and security policies should be easy for users to understand (Rowan & Dehlinger, 
2014; Shneiderman et al., 2016). However, Terms of Service (TOS), permissions requirements, 
and privacy policies often employ such small fonts and complex language that they can be tough 
to read (Burkell & Fortier, 2013a; Bustos-Jiménez, 2014). In their study, Rowan and Dehlinger 
(2014) found that the average privacy policy was written above the 12th-grade level and was an 
average of 4.8 pages long. By contrast, the recommended writing level for health or safety 
instruction documents is the 5th grade, and documents for the general public is the 9th grade.  
     Another concern is that privacy policies do not always accurately represent the behavior of 
the application. For instance, Njie (2016) found that only about 50% of the apps analyzed posted 
a privacy policy and adhered to it. Other studies have shown that some apps have no policy at all, 
or the app's privacy policy did not mention such items as behavioral tracking, third-party sharing 
policies, and data retention and ownership (Paul & Irvine, 2014; Rowan & Dehlinger, 2014). 
Another concern with privacy policies concerns the retrieval of multiple items of a person’s EHR 
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from several apps on the person’s phone. Even if each piece of data gathered is within the 
privacy policy of the app providing it, the aggregate data may provide more of the EHR than 
intended or acceptable (Ammar et al., 2014). 
     Also, it seems that apps with the most detailed privacy policies often pose some of the 
greatest privacy risks (Ackerman, 2016). This suggests that privacy policies are written primarily 
to protect the company rather than the user, purposely doing so in a way that's difficult for the 
average user to understand (Njie, 2016). 
Patient vulnerability and trust 
     A person’s medical records contain an extensive amount of deeply personal information, 
collected over the course of their life (Rindfleisch, 1997; Wen & Tarn, 2006). A person's record 
might include such information as dietary habits, sexual orientation, history of diseases, 
medications, family history, laboratory test results, x-rays, and a host of other data (Choi, 
Capitan, Krause, & Streeper, 2006). In the past, such information was maintained in paper 
records in hospitals and doctors’ offices, which were kept securely locked and accessible only by 
select personnel (Choi et al., 2006). While automation was initially intended to reduce paper 
processing and increase efficiency, today's health system could not survive without it (Choi et 
al., 2006; Rindfleisch, 1997). However, information technology and the related devices used to 
store, process, and transmit vital medical information pose serious threats to patient privacy. 
While individuals may feel comfortable with families knowing certain details of their medical 
condition, they will certainly not consider it appropriate for release to the public (Al Ameen et 
al., 2012). In addition to causing the patient embarrassment, it could also affect their lives in 
other ways. For instance, evidence of pre-existing conditions or personal conduct and habits 
could make it difficult to obtain employment, insurance, or other types of aid (Rindfleisch, 1997; 
  
29 
Sun et al., 2010; Wen & Tarn, 2006). A patient may be discriminated against for having certain 
types of illnesses and may be charged more for services based on the information contained in 
the record. In extreme cases, location tracking could be used to harm the individual physically 
(Jiya, 2016). As a result, patients may lie or omit details when talking with their doctor out of 
fear of the consequences of a possible breach (Choi et al., 2006; Wen & Tarn, 2006).   
Current federal regulations and regulatory bodies  
     Before the passage of HIPAA, there was little federal legislation to protect patient privacy. 
Individual states were on their own when it came to the issue of personal privacy protection. At 
the time of HIPAA, only 30 states identified invasion of privacy as a punishable offense, and 
there was no uniformity among any of the states (Baumer, Earp, & Payton, 2000).  
     HIPAA was implemented to protect patient data but does not apply to everyone collecting or 
storing a patient's information. Health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers 
who conduct certain financial and administrative transactions electronically are referred to as 
“covered entities” under the act and are the only ones accountable (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, 2003). The Act has undergone many improvements over the years, the 
most recent being the HIPAA Omnibus Rule of 2013. This rule strengthened HIPAA in many 
ways, such as making business associates of covered entities liable for compliance. Also, it 
strengthened the limitations on the use and disclosure of PHI for marketing and fundraising 
purposes and adopted the HITECH Act enhancements to the Enforcement Rule (Leyva, 2013). 
However, the rule does not include entities that collect data from users via smartphone apps or 
wearable monitoring systems not developed for use specifically for or by a covered entity or 
business partner, meaning that such entities are exempt from regulation (Paul & Irvine, 2014). 
The responsibility of protecting patient's privacy lies squarely in the hands of the patient (when 
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choosing to provide their information to a third-party to use their app) and the privacy laws of 
the individual state where the patient lives. 
     When it comes to regulatory agencies, the American Health Information Management 
Association identifies five most likely to have the greatest impact on mobile health apps going 
forward (Yang & Silverman, 2014): The National Institute of Standards and Technology, The 
Federal Communications Commission, The Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration.  
     The National Institute of Standards and Technology is not a regulatory body, but it can issue 
guidance on standards for technology such as mobile devices and software. The Federal 
Communications Commission reserves the 608-614 MHz, 1395-1400MHz, and 1427-1432MHz 
ranges for wireless medical telemetry (Federal Communications Commission, 2017). The Office 
for Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) monitors HIPAA 
violations, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulates false or deceptive advertising 
(Yang & Silverman, 2014). The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has released detailed 
guidance on the specific subset of mobile medical apps over which it intends to enforce its 
authority (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration, 2015; 
Yang & Silverman, 2014). It details which mobile apps are considered medical devices and 
which are not. Also, it provides examples of current regulations, regulatory, requirements, and 
provides a frequently asked questions and additional resources section to aid marketers and 
developers (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration, 
2015). While the guidance documents are not enforceable, manufacturers still tend to follow 
them to prevent action by the FDA and consumer complaints (Yang & Silverman, 2014).     
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Misinterpretation of regulations 
     Today's software developers are required to navigate a plethora of laws and regulations when 
designing their systems (Choi et al., 2006). As companies attempt to conform to these 
requirements, they must take care not to create security policies that are so convoluted and 
riddled with legalese that they end up confusing the employees and hampering their work efforts 
(Shneiderman et al., 2016). Healthcare providers, insurance companies, and attorneys alike have 
interpreted HIPAA differently, making it tough to ensure complete compliance (Varshney, 
2007). Many violations are believed to be the result of how companies interpret regulations 
within the context of their business environment and information systems. Unfortunately, 
organizations are liable in case of violation of regulations regardless of the accuracy of their 
interpretation of the regulation or intent to comply (Breaux & Anton, 2008).  
     Patients can misinterpret regulations as well. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 
definition of a “medically regulated device” can be confusing, causing consumers to mistakenly 
believe an app labeled as “medical” is provided by medical professionals or contains the 
appropriate privacy and security measures required by federal regulations (Brzan et al., 2016). 
Existing state legislation regarding protection of medical data  
     Many states have gone beyond federal standards by installing and maintaining health IT 
infrastructure and enacting legislation to further enhance the security and privacy of patient data 
(2016b). Such regulations permit states to tailor the protection of their residents to a more 
stringent level than that provided by federal regulations for providers doing business within their 
state. Some examples include the maintenance of medical records, what medical records must 
include, privacy and confidentiality, requirements for disclosure of personal health information 
(to whom and for what purpose) (2016b). 
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     Currently, 20 states have laws to deal with the collection and treatment of patient data and 
records. While there is no clear uniformity among the states, there are some similarities (Health 
Information & the Law, 2016b). The passage of the California Online Privacy Protection Act of 
2003 set the state of California apart as the first state in the United States to require commercial 
websites to post privacy policies if they collect Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from a 
person in California (Cooley Godward, 2016). California also leads the way with state laws often 
more stringent than HIPAA in 15 categories (Health Information & the Law, 2016b).  
 
Summary 
     Patient monitoring systems have evolved significantly over time. BSNs consisting of tiny 
sensors on or in the body have been used for many years in the healthcare field to provide real-
time data to medical staff (Caldeira et al., 2012). They have evolved to provide everything from 
patient ambulatory status, vital signs (Calhoun et al., 2012), and control devices such as insulin 
pumps (Calhoun et al., 2012; Hanson et al., 2009). They are also being used to control prosthetic 
devices and assist the hearing and visually impaired (Calhoun et al., 2012). While these systems 
can provide invaluable assistance in the home monitoring system, they tend to be highly 
specialized, which results in high cost and limited ability to port to other systems (Hanson et al., 
2009).  
     Manufacturers and researchers recognized this problem and began to explore ways to 
leverage existing technology. Lee et al. (2015) employed a smartphone and smartwatch to 
estimate a user’s location within the home. Ghose et al. (2013) employed multiple Microsoft 
Kinect systems throughout a user’s house to monitor their physical and mental status. Another 
approach was to monitor a user’s activity by analyzing electrical appliance usage in the house to 
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identify what the user was doing throughout the day (Alcalá et al., 2015). Gesture, facial 
recognition, and movement recognition elements in gaming systems examined by Dhillon et al. 
(2012) showed promise in the areas of physical rehabilitation, home communication with 
caregivers and doctors for patients for whom travel was uncomfortable or otherwise difficult, and 
the treatment of social phobias by reducing the need for interaction with the external 
environment. 
     While these systems show promise in the home monitoring environment, they are not without 
risk. The use of smartphones, home networks, and downloadable apps put patient privacy at risk 
(Jiya, 2016). The combination of systems that were not initially intended to function together as 
a single system carries additional concerns. Different privacy protection profiles (Calhoun et al., 
2012), opt-in/opt-out defaults (Bellman et al., 2001) and privacy policies that are difficult to read 
(Burkell & Fortier, 2013b; Bustos-Jiménez, 2014) or are not adhered to by the application (Njie, 
2016) can put user data at risk.  
     While HIPAA was implemented to protect patient data, only covered entities (health plans, 
healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers who conduct certain financial and 
administrative transactions electronically) are accountable under the act (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2003). The HIPAA Omnibus Rule of 2013 expanded the definition 
of a covered entity to include business associates of covered entities, tightened down the use and 
disclosure of PHI for marketing and fundraising, and adopted the HITECH Act enhancements to 
the Enforcement Rule (Leyva, 2013). However, only covered entities and business partners are 
accountable (Paul & Irvine, 2014).    
     The current legislation is complex in both language and scope. Developers may never be fully 
confident that they are in compliance (Varshney, 2007) due to different interpretations of the 
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regulations, and users may incorrectly assume that a device or app is protected under federal 
regulations because the FDA labeled it a “medically regulated device” or a “medical app” (Brzan 
et al., 2016). 
     Some states have already begun passing legislation to protect patient data at a level beyond 
what federal regulations require. While some similarities exist, there is no uniformity across 
states regarding such protection (Health Information & the Law, 2016b).   
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Overview of research methodology/design 
     This study examined privacy legislation in California. The specific focus was in-home mobile 
health monitoring systems developed and maintained by organizations or individuals not 
classified as covered entities under HIPAA. The focus of this study was to identify what 
California was doing to protect the privacy of seniors – specifically those using in-home health 
monitoring systems.  
     This study was originally designed to examine legislation by gathering data from the state 
legislative websites and interviews with legislators involved in the legislation identified during 
the legislative search. The original study also called for a two-state case study consisting of 
California, due to its reputation for groundbreaking privacy laws (Lovells, 2013; Willcox, 2017) 
and high population of seniors (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014); and Florida, because of the high 
percentage of seniors relative to the overall state population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). The 
researcher was able to find an abundance of legislative data on California on their website, but 
the Florida legislative website provided limited data relevant to this study. Furthermore, finding 
legislators to interview proved an additional challenge. The researcher identified a total of 18 
legislators – eight from California and 10 from Florida – to interview based on the analysis of the 
legislation gathered from the state websites and committee membership. While this initially 
showed promise, a lack of willingness and availability to participate among those contacted 
proved far more problematic. None of the legislators in Florida would agree to participate within 
the required 90-day timeframe, and so the combination of a lack of legislative data obtained from 
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Florida’s legislative website and a lack of participants resulted in an inability to gather sufficient 
data on the state of Florida. The researcher requested permission to drop the state and change the 
study to a single-state case study consisting of California only. The researcher received approval 
of the committee on December 16th, 2018 and changed the study accordingly.  
     The researcher removed the data from Florida and performed the data analysis again with 
only legislation from California. The researcher identified eight legislators who contributed the 
most to the topics relevant to this study and reached out to their state capitol offices via 
telephone at the number listed on the California senate web site. Four of the eight declined, three 
agreed to a written form of the questions, and one agreed to a telephone interview. The 
researcher then created the questionnaire (Appendix B) and sent it out to all four respondents on 
November 21, 2018. The researcher conducted the telephone interview on November 29, 2018. 
The researcher sent out a follow-up email to the three remaining respondents on December 7, 
2018 since results had not yet been received by them at that point. One of the respondents 
declined to participate after reviewing the questionnaire and referred the researcher to a different 
source. The researcher received one questionnaire response on December 12, 2018. The 
researcher reached out to the fourth respondent on January 2, 2019 (after the holiday break) and 
discovered that the individual responsible for coordinating the effort had left the office and 
hadn’t told anyone about the interview. The researcher sent the email thread along with the 
consent form and questionnaire to the replacement contact on January 2, 2019. The respondent 
agreed to a telephone interview but stated at the beginning of the interview that they were unable 
to help but appreciated the interest and would contact the researcher if they could find anyone 
else that might be able to contribute to the study. This resulted in only two of the original four 
respondents participating in the survey. This did not provide a sufficient sample size of 
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participants, and so the survey and interview data were discarded. The discarded data from the 
study (Instrument development and validation, Data analysis, Survey results, and Implications) 
are included in Appendix C. 
     The exclusion of the survey and interview data left only the data collected online, which is not 
suitable for a case study (Terrell, 2016). However, the data from the California legislative web 
site proved sufficient to address the research questions in this study on its own. In this case a 
content analysis is appropriate (Terrell, 2016), and so the researcher changed the study once 
again. The researcher presented the findings/synthesis of the online data collection. A list of 
potential participants along with the results of the researcher’s attempt to make contact with them 
is presented in table 1. 
Table 1 
List of potential participants and results 
Candidate State Result 
1 Florida Unable to make contact 
2 Florida Unable to make contact 
3 California Declined to participate 
4 California Participated via questionnaire (Participant A-2) 
5 Florida Unable to make contact 
6 California Declined to participate 
7 Florida Unable to make contact 
8 California Declined to participate 
9 California Declined to participate 
10 California Participated via telephone interview (Participant A-1) 
11 California Changed their mind. Referred the researcher to C12 
12 California Agreed to telephone interview, then stated they couldn’t help  
13 Florida No response to original or follow-up request 
14 Florida No response to original or follow-up request 
15 Florida No response to original or follow-up request 
16 Florida No response to original or follow-up request 
17 Florida Unable to make contact 
18 Florida Unable to make contact 
19 California Staff changes resulted in lost paperwork. Did not participate 
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     This study had the potential to amass a large amount of data, and so it was necessary to define 
a point at which the study was considered complete. In the case of the literature review, the data 
was limited to a period of not more than five years and within the scope defined by this study (e-
PHI privacy policies best suited to seniors using in-home health monitoring systems). State 
legislation was broken down into two parts: a review of data available from the state legislative 
web sites (http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/legIndexTosaTemplate.xhtml, and 
http://www.legislature.ca.gov/bill_index2.html) and data obtained from state archives and 
libraries (when necessary). Obtaining information in this manner could potentially take a 
significant amount of time, and so data collection terminated after 90 days and included a log of 
information obtained, by whom, and if data collection was terminated due to no response or 
inability to access the archival data. This information was included in the analysis section as a 
caveat to provide clarification and to prevent confusion when data collection was terminated due 
to no response. 
 
Research questions 
     The main research question of this work was – what was the California state legislature doing 
to protect the security and privacy of users of in-home mobile health monitoring systems? 
Specifically, those developed and maintained by organizations or individuals not classified as 
covered entities under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA)? 
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RQ 1: What legislation did California have in place governing the development and maintenance 
of the technology used with mobile in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained 
by organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities under HIPAA? 
RQ2: What legislation did California have in place to protect the privacy of seniors using mobile 
in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained by organizations or individuals 
not classified as covered entities under HIPAA? 
RQ3: What was the required technical and legal expertise California needed to develop and 
enforce such legislation? 
 
Specific research method(s) to be employed 
     The purpose of this study was to learn what was being done at the legislative level to protect 
the security and privacy of users using in-home mobile health monitoring systems. Specifically, 
those developed and maintained by organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities 
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).  
The study focused on California state legislation using the internet, and so a content analysis was 
called for.  
 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
     In any study, it is the researcher’s responsibility to ensure no physical or psychological harm 
comes to the participants (Terrell, 2016). The researcher received Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) approval on November 7, 2017 (See Appendix A for IRB approval). 
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Instrument development and validation 
     The researcher collected data via examination of publicly available information. No other 
instruments were used. 
 
Sample 
     The researcher examined California, due to its reputation for groundbreaking privacy laws 
(Lovells, 2013; Willcox, 2017); and high population of seniors (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). 
California State legislation was obtained via review of data available from the state legislative 
web sites (http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/legIndexTosaTemplate.xhtml, and 
http://www.legislature.ca.gov/bill_index2.html), and data obtained from state archives and 
libraries (when necessary). 
 
Data analysis 
     The researcher conducted a content analysis drawing from Terrell (2016) to conduct data 
analysis. The researcher conducted a content analysis of California legislation beginning with an 
extensive review of the literature from the Internet. The researcher analyzed and coded the data 
to identify patterns, concepts, and relationships.  
 
Formats for presenting results 
     The results were presented in a tabular format with charts and illustrations as appropriate. 
Sections were broken down by research question and compared and contrasted the findings of 
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extant literature and current and proposed legislation. The results of the study are presented in 
chapter four. 
 
Resource requirements 
     This study required exhaustive examination of California legislation to learn what was being 
done at the legislative level to protect the security and privacy of users using in-home mobile 
health monitoring systems. Specifically, those developed and maintained by organizations or 
individuals not classified as covered entities under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Sources included data available from the Internet and state 
archives and libraries. A discussion of these resources, as well as additional resources required 
for data analysis and reporting, follows. 
     The researcher conducted an exploratory study consisting of a review of state legislation, 
industry best practices, and extant literature to identify both the current and proposed legislation 
regarding the protection of e-PHI data of those using in-home health monitoring systems. 
 
Summary 
     The purpose of this study was to learn what was being done at the legislative level to protect 
the security and privacy of users using in-home mobile health monitoring systems. Specifically, 
those developed and maintained by organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities 
under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).  
     The researcher conducted a content analysis of California legislation beginning with an 
extensive review of the literature from the Internet. The researcher analyzed and coded the data 
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to identify patterns, concepts, and relationships. The results of the study are detailed in chapter 
four.  
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
Introduction 
     The results of the study are discussed in this chapter. Data were gathered during the period of 
May 7 to December 12, 2018. The original plan proved inadequate and had to be modified to 
produce more relevant results. The detailed results are included and discussed. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the results. 
 
Data Collection 
     The researcher began with a Boolean search of the literature using terms that best represented 
the intended direction of the study: Privacy AND medical, Privacy AND medical AND devices, 
and Privacy AND medical AND monitoring. Although the searches yielded a seemingly large 
number of hits (Table 2), the search yielded duplicate records  
and other data not relevant to this study. It became clear that a new search method needed to be 
used.  
Table 2 
Number of hits for California by search term and legislative session 
Search term 2013-2014 2015-2016 2017-2018 Total 
Privacy AND Medical 116 113 137 366 
Privacy AND Medical AND Devices 33 39 36 108 
Privacy AND Medical AND Monitoring 39 48 61 148 
Total 188 200 234 622 
 
     The researcher further consulted the legislative site for California and found legislative 
archives listing each bill presented for consideration by topic for each legislative year available. 
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Using this new method, the researcher was able to gather a much richer pool of data from which 
to draw that would be broken down by subject. After reviewing all topics/subjects the researcher 
identified topics relevant to this study as listed in table 3. 
Table 3 
Number of bills by topic and year for California 
Topic Year 
  2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total 
Aged persons 2 4 2 1 1 10 
Computers and technology, Etc. 0 4 3 5 6 18 
Data protection authority, California 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Identification 1 1 0 0 0 2 
Internet 1 3 0 0 1 5 
Medi-Cal 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Records 2 5 3 1 1 12 
Right of privacy 3 0 0 0 1 4 
Short titles 1 0 1 0 1 3 
Telephone corporations and telephones 1 3 1 0 0 5 
Theft 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Total 13 22 12 7 13 67 
 
     The researcher analyzed and coded the legislation gathered in table 3. Seven themes emerged 
as a result of the coding process: 
• Aging in place, 
• Computer crimes, 
• Mobile devices and applications, 
• Personal information, 
• Policies, procedures, and standards, 
• Security breach notification, and 
• Web site policies. 
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Results 
     Table 4 presents a summary of the results of the data gathered from the legislative search. 
Each piece of legislation is listed beneath the research question supported.  
Table 4 
Summary of results 
RQ 1: What legislation did California have in place governing the development and maintenance of the technology used with 
mobile in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained by organizations or individuals not classified as covered 
entities under HIPAA? 
Resource Subject of bill supporting research question 
California A.B. 22 (2017) Storing and recording electronic media, cloud computing, trusted system. While this legislation 
does not mention seniors or mobile in-home health monitoring systems specifically, it 
specifically mentions the technology used with such systems (cloud computing and storing and 
recording) and establishes a requirement for using a trusted system with regard to protecting 
data statewide. 
California A.B. 32 (2015) increased protection for computer data and computer systems. This legislation encompasses all 
users and computer hardware systems - not just seniors and in-home health monitoring 
systems. 
California S.B. 962 (2014) Requires software solution, hardware solution, or both that can disable the voice 
communications, text messaging, internet browsing, and mobile software applications. 
Emergency services and 911 would not be affected. 
California A.B. 1681 (2016) Requires a manufacturer of a smartphone to provide a means of decryption when ordered by 
the Attorney General or a district attorney. 
RQ2: What legislation did California have in place to protect the privacy of seniors using mobile in-home health monitoring 
systems developed and maintained by organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities under HIPAA? 
California H.R. 10 (2017) Establishes Data Privacy Day (01/28/2017) 
California A.B. 22 (2017) Storing and recording electronic media, cloud computing, trusted system. While this legislation 
does not mention seniors or mobile in-home health monitoring systems specifically, it 
specifically mentions the technology used with such systems (cloud computing and storing and 
recording) and establishes a requirement for using a trusted system with regard to protecting 
data statewide.  
California A.B. 32 (2015) increased protection for computer data and computer systems. This legislation encompasses all 
users and computer hardware systems - not just seniors and in-home health monitoring 
systems. 
California A.B. 83 (2015) Requires a business to develop and enforce security procedures and practices to protect the 
information it gathers on California residents. Also requires the business to have a contract 
with a third party with whom it shares that information to provide the same protection. 
California A.B. 259 (2015) Provides specific details and format for disclosing a breach of personal information. 
Additionally, requires offer to provide identity theft prevention services for free for a minimum 
of 12 months. 
California A.B. 322 (2015) Requires social security numbers be encrypted when electronically gathered, stored, or 
transmitted. Also prohibits use of social security number for web site access unless it was one 
element of two-factor authentication.  
California A.B. 375 (2018) The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. Provides various protections for user's personal 
information, and guarantees users access to and control over the information.  
California A.B. 441 (2015) identity theft, seniors 
California S.B. 570 (2015) Provides specific details and format for disclosing a breach of personal information. 
California S.B. 576 (2015) Requires a mobile application to tell users when, how, and why their geolocation information 
is collected, used, and shared. This must be done when the application is installed. The user 
must provide additional consent before their information is shared. 
California A.B. 695 (2015) A person may not impersonate someone using the internet, a web site, or "other electronic 
means" when interacting with someone else. This protection covers everyone no matter how 
they are connected to the internet or what electronic device they are using.  
California A.B. 739 (2015) Requires a person, business, or agency who maintains personal information in electronic 
format to take appropriate steps to protect the security of the information. 
California A.B. 925 (2015) Prohibits intentional interception or recording communications via cell, cordless, or landline 
phone without the user's consent.   
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California S.B. 956 (2016) Identity theft 
California A.B. 964 (2015) Provides specific details and format for disclosing a breach of personal information. 
California S.B. 1026 (2018) Provides for home modifications for safer living 
California S.B. 1121 (2018) disclosure requirements for businesses that gather personal information 
California S.B. 1137 (2016) Prohibits the introduction, or threat of introduction, of ransomware into a system. 
California A.B. 1192 (2015) Universal privacy policy for mobile platforms. Provides protection to all users of mobile apps, 
not just seniors using in-home health monitoring systems. 
California S.B. 1307 (2014) Identity theft 
California S.B. 1348 (2014) Data brokers, sale of personal information 
California A.B. 1671 (2016) Protects all users from intentional eavesdropping and recording without consent. Confidential 
communication with health care provider is specifically mentioned. Also, some components 
used by in-home health monitoring systems, such has telephones, are included in this 
legislation and so would provide protection for the system as a whole.  
California A.B. 1906 (2018) This bill addresses security features of Internet-connected devices and requires businesses to 
protect the personal information it gathers about California residents. All residents are covered, 
not just seniors.  
California A.B. 1950 (2018) The privacy policy posting, and adherence requirements specified in this legislation provide the 
user with detailed information on the gathering, sale, and sharing of their information, which 
allows users to make an informed decision about whether or not they wish to use the service  
California A.B. 2167 (2018) Provides security of data collected by an application interfacing with digital health feedback 
system. 
California A.B. 2182 (2018) Provides specific details and format for disclosing a breach of personal information. 
California A.B. 2306 (2014) Provides protection from physical and constructive invasion of privacy. Protection applies to 
all persons regardless of age.  
California A.B. 2678 (2018) Provides specific details and format for disclosing a breach of personal information. 
California A.B. 2688 (2016) requires commercial health monitoring programs provide notice and obtain consent from users 
before sharing, selling, or disclosing their information. 
California A.B. 2828 (2016) Provides specific details and format for disclosing a breach of personal information, 
specifically in case where encrypted personal information plus encryption key were definitely 
or possibly compromised. 
RQ3: What was the required technical and legal expertise California needed to develop and enforce such legislation? 
 
Aging in place 
     California recognizes that the American population is aging at an increasing rate. On the 
national level, the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in 2007 found that people 
age 65 and over represented 12.6 percent of the American population, and that number is 
expected to climb to 20 percent by 2030 – totaling 70 million, with 12 million residing in 
California (California A.B. 1261, 2015; California A.C.R. 49, 2015). On the state level, United 
States Census data reports over four million seniors currently reside in California – making it the 
largest population in the country (California A.B. 1261, 2015).   
     Family support is critical in permitting seniors to continue living in their home. However, the 
physical, emotional, and financial demands on the seniors, loved ones, and society is 
considerable (California A.C.R. 49, 2015). For example, the California Legislature finds that 
family caregivers typically spend 20 hours per week providing personal support and managing 
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the household, and 59% of them are employed either full – or part-time (California A.B. 1744, 
2014; California A.C.R. 38, 2015). This contributes approximately 3.9 billion hours and $47B of 
value in unpaid services and support, equivalent to 125% of total Medi-Cal spending and 410% 
of long-term services and support (California A.C.R. 38, 2015). With nearly 75% of seniors 
living at home and in need of personal assistance relying entirely on unpaid caregivers and 70% 
of those suffering Alzheimer’s disease and related disorders requiring daily assistance, the 
impact to California’s health and long-term care service and support infrastructure would be 
disastrous if family caregivers were no longer in the picture (California A.C.R. 38, 2015). 
     The California Task Force on Family Caregiving was created to help encourage and empower 
family caregivers. The task force would consist of 12 members from the research, caregiving, 
and senior advocacy arenas and would – until July 31, 2018 – consult with current family 
caregivers, institutional providers, researchers, academics, and resource centers to better 
understand caregiver challenges and current services available to them. The task force would 
partner with the California Commission on Aging (whenever possible) and make policy 
recommendations to the California Legislature (California A.C.R. 38, 2015).  
     Several efforts have been created over the years to assist in aging. The Dignity at Home and 
Fall Prevention Program was created to assist seniors in combating injury risks from falls in the 
home (California S.B. 1026, 2018). Conditions such as narrow doorways, steps, staircases, low 
electric sockets, and high cabinets can cause difficulties for seniors living alone and increase 
their risk of falls and injuries. The program provides grants for assessments and modifications of 
qualified seniors’ homes to provide a safer environment for them to live in. The program also 
provides for certain equipment and services such as grab bars, hand rails, nonskid surface 
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treatments, wearable medical alert devices. Eligibility requirements include income, disability, 
has or is at risk of falling, and is unable to afford the modifications (California S.B. 1026, 2018). 
     California’s commitment to helping seniors live independently dates back to the 
establishment of Adult Day Health Care (ADHC) in 1974. ADHC centers provide seniors with 
various health and social services including transportation, meals, assistance with daily activities, 
and physical and speech therapy. ADHC was an optional benefit of Medi-Cal until the Budget 
Act of 2011 and the related trailer bill, Chapter 3 of the Statutes of 2011 eliminated it as an 
option, resulting in a class action lawsuit claiming violation of Americans with Disabilities Act 
(California A.B. 1261, 2015). 
     California settled the lawsuit by creating a new program called Community-based Adult 
Services (CBAS). This program – as April 1, 2012 – replaced ADHC to ensure seniors and 
individuals with advanced health care needs received the nursing, therapeutic and personal care 
services, health monitoring, and caregiver support they needed. The program continues to this 
day (California A.B. 1261, 2015). 
 
Computer crimes 
     The prevalence of computer technology in society provides a wealth of opportunity for 
criminals and hackers to gain unauthorized access to computers and data (California A.B. 32, 
2015). Seniors and dependent adults may be particularly vulnerable as medications, physical, or 
mental impairments might make it difficult to protect themselves or identify when they are being 
taken advantage of. They may also be unable to reliably report criminal conduct or testify in 
court on their own behalf (California A.B. 1718, 2016; California A.B. 329, 2017). Indeed, 
California passed legislation requiring the Department of Justice to post a notice on the Attorney 
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General’s web site to warn the public about fraud against seniors and dependent adults, along 
with guidance on filing a complaint (California A.B. 2721, 2016). Current and proposed 
California laws provide protection for seniors and dependent adults from false imprisonment 
(California A.B. 1718, 2016; California A.B. 329, 2017) , and enhanced sentencing for many 
crimes in cases where victims are seniors (California A.B. 1718, 2016; California A.B. 329, 
2017; California A.B. 441, 2015).  
     The California state legislature recognizes the dangers of computer crimes. Indeed, California 
A.B. 32 (2015) specifies the following behaviors as a public offense: 
• Knowingly accesses and without permission  
o alters, damages, deletes, destroys, or otherwise uses any data, computer, computer 
system, or computer network in order to either (A) devise or execute any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, deceive, or extort, or (B) wrongfully control or obtain money, 
property, or data. 
o takes, copies, or makes use of any data from a computer, computer system, or 
computer network, or takes or copies any supporting documentation, whether existing 
or residing internal or external to a computer, computer system, or computer network.  
o adds, alters, damages, deletes, or destroys any data, computer software, or computer 
programs which reside or exist internal or external to a public safety infrastructure 
computer system computer, computer system, or computer network. 
o adds, alters, damages, deletes, or destroys any data, computer software, or computer 
programs which reside or exist internal or external to a computer, computer system, 
or computer network. 
• Knowingly and without permission  
o uses or causes to be used computer services. 
o disrupts or causes the disruption of computer services or denies or causes the denial 
of computer services to an authorized user of a computer, computer system, or 
computer network. 
o provides or assists in providing a means of accessing a computer, computer system, 
or computer network in violation of this section. 
o accesses or causes to be accessed any computer, computer system, or computer 
network. 
o uses the Internet domain name or profile of another individual, corporation, or entity 
in connection with the sending of one or more electronic mail messages or posts and 
thereby damages or causes damage to a computer, computer data, computer system, 
or computer network. 
o disrupts or causes the disruption of government computer services or denies or causes 
the denial of government computer services to an authorized user of a government 
computer, computer system, or computer network. 
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o disrupts or causes the disruption of public safety infrastructure computer system 
computer services or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an 
authorized user of a public safety infrastructure computer system computer, computer 
system, or computer network. 
o provides or assists in providing a means of accessing a computer, computer system, 
or public safety infrastructure computer system computer, computer system, or 
computer network in violation of this section. 
• Knowingly introduces any computer contaminant into any 
o computer, computer system, or computer network. 
o public safety infrastructure computer system computer, computer system, or 
computer network (pp. 3-4).  
 
     California provides protection against ransomware as well. A person is punishable whether 
they personally introduced the ransomware to the system or had someone else do it. Also, any 
person delivering a letter or other written form threatening or implying is punishable as if the 
money or ransom were actually obtained (California S.B. 1137, 2016). 
     Confidential communications are also protected. For example, eavesdropping on or recording 
a confidential communication conducted over telephone or other device (except a radio) is 
prohibited by state law (California A.B. 1671, 2016). Communications between two cellular 
phones, a cell phone and landline, two cordless phones, and a cordless phone and a landline 
would be protected under proposed legislation (California A.B. 925, 2015). In addition, the 
contents of a confidential communication with a health care provider may not be shared on social 
media, internet web sites, or any other forum (California A.B. 1671, 2016). 
     The Identity Theft Resolution Act requires a debt collector who provided adverse information 
about a debtor to notify the credit agency that the account is disputed and initiate a review within 
10 business days. If the debt collector does not resume collection activities, they must notify the 
credit agency to delete the adverse information (California A.B. 1723, 2016).  
     California legislation also provides protection from impersonation. For example, legislation 
was proposed to provide for civil action against any person who “knowingly and without 
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consent” impersonates another person via the internet, by web site, or other electronic means and 
convinces another to believe they are the impersonated person (California A.B. 695, 2015).  
     Another form of impersonation prohibited in California are the use of bots. California law 
requires a person who uses a bot to motivate a sale or a vote in an election must provide “clear, 
conspicuous, and reasonably designed” notice that the person is talking to a bot (California S.B. 
1001, 2018). 
     Identity theft is another problem in society, and California provides protections for that as 
well. Anyone who uses another person’s identifying information without their consent and uses it 
to open credit, purchase goods or services, or obtain medical information” is guilty of a crime 
under California law (California S.B. 1307, 2014; California S.B. 956, 2016). Sale of the stolen 
information is illegal as well, as is electronic transmission or physical transfer (California S.B. 
1307, 2014). For the person whose identity was stolen, however, state law protects the courts to 
reflect that they were falsely identified as the perpetrator as a result of their identity having been 
stolen (California S.B. 1307, 2014; California S.B. 956, 2016). 
     Invasion of privacy is another method of computer crime, and it falls in to two categories: 
physical invasion of privacy and constructive invasion of privacy. While both types involve an 
attempt to obtain a visual, audio, or physical image of a person in a way that a “reasonable 
person” would find offensive, the two differ in terms of method of capture. Physical invasion of 
privacy requires a physical trespass on a person’s land, whereas constructive invasion of privacy 
occurs when the desired visual, audio, or physical image is captured using a device designed to 
be used from a suitable distance so as to make physical trespass unnecessary (California A.B. 
2306, 2014). 
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Mobile devices and applications 
     California introduced legislation requiring a mobile application to provide “clear and 
conspicuous notice that fully informs consumers when, how, and why their geolocation 
information will be collected, used, and shared upon installation of the application” (California 
S.B. 576, 2015) and to obtain additional consent prior to disclosing the information.   
     The California legislature recognized several years ago the importance of a technological 
smartphone security solution to protect not only the devices themselves, but of the data they 
contain (California S.B. 962, 2014). California law now requires smartphones manufactured and 
sold after July 1, 2015 to contain a software solution, a hardware solution, or both that – when 
triggered – can disable the voice communications, text messaging, internet browsing, and mobile 
software applications (not including 911 and emergency services) capabilities of the smartphone 
when it has been lost or stolen (California S.B. 962, 2014). This solution must be able to 
withstand a factory reset and prevent anyone other than the authorized user from reactivating the 
features. The user has the option to disable the feature(s) or opt out at any time. The 
requirements of the law no longer apply if the smartphone is resold, consigned, or held as 
collateral (California S.B. 962, 2014).   
     Proposed California legislation would require a manufacturer or operator of an application 
that interfaces with a digital health feedback system be equipped with security features to protect 
the device and the data stored, processed, and transmitted on it from “unauthorized access, 
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure” (California A.B. 2167, 2018). The same holds true 
for businesses that gather personal information about California residents (California A.B. 1906, 
2018). 
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     Proposed California law considered a business that provides a mobile application that 
maintains medical information for the purpose of: providing information to the user or health 
care provider; allowing the user to manage their information; or for the “diagnosis, treatment, or 
management of a medical condition of the individual” to be a health care provider. It would 
therefore be subject to the same standards and punishments imposed under law to any other 
health care provider (California A.B. 2167, 2018).  
     In addition to protections for smartphones and their operating systems, California law also 
requires a manufacturer of a smartphone sold or leased in California on or after January 1, 2017 
to be able to decrypt the contents of the device when served a court order. If they are unable to 
do so, a fine of $2,500 for each instance will be imposed, which they cannot pass on – in whole 
or in part – to the consumer. Only the Attorney General or a district attorney can enforce the 
provisions of this law (California A.B. 1681, 2016). 
     Proposed California law would require the provider of a mobile operating system or platform 
upon which developers create mobile applications that collect personal data from an individual 
California user, either through the mobile application or an online service, to create universal 
privacy policy standards based on transparency, security, and other principles (California A.B. 
1192, 2015). The proposed law would also require standards be posted on their web site – in a 
format accessible to all users – and require the developer to accept them (California A.B. 1192, 
2015).    
     The Confidentiality of Medical Information Act prohibits any business that offers software or 
hardware to customers – including mobile applications – from “sharing, selling, or otherwise 
using” a patient’s medical information for any purpose other than that which is required for the 
patient’s care, unless properly authorized or required by law (California A.B. 2688, 2016). 
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Additional legislation expanded the protection of user’s data to include operators of commercial 
health monitoring programs. Furthermore, the operator is now required to provide “clear and 
conspicuous” notice, and to obtain the user’s consent before disclosing patient information 
gathered by the system. Some exemptions to consent were added as well (California A.B. 2688, 
2016). 
     California A.B. 1192 (2015) proposed the following guidance based on the principles of the 
Fair Information Practices Act for developers and operators of mobile operating systems and 
platforms: 
• Be transparent and notify individuals regarding collection, use, dissemination, and 
maintenance of personal data. 
• Involve individuals in the process of using personal data and, to the extent practicable, 
seek individual consent for the collection, use, dissemination, and maintenance of 
personal data. 
• Specifically articulate the authority that permits the collection of personal data and the 
purpose or purposes for which the personal data is intended to be used by defining the 
functional purpose of the mobile application and how an individual’s personal data is 
used to contribute to that functional purpose. 
• Only collect personal data that is directly relevant and necessary to accomplish the 
purpose or purposes for which the personal data is intended to be used, and only retain 
personal data for as long as necessary to fulfill the specified purpose or purposes. 
• Use personal data solely for the purpose or purposes specified in the notice to the user. 
Sharing personal data should be for a purpose compatible with the purpose or purposes 
for which the personal data was collected. 
• Ensure, to the extent practicable, that personal data is accurate, relevant, timely, and 
complete. 
• Protect personal data in all media through appropriate safeguards against risks, including, 
but not limited to, loss, unauthorized access or use, destruction, modification, or 
unintended or inappropriate disclosure. 
• Be accountable for complying with the principles of the Fair Information Practices Act, 
provide training to all employees and contractors who use personal data, and audit the 
actual use of personal data to demonstrate compliance with the principles of the Fair 
Information Practices Act and all applicable privacy protection requirements and laws 
(pp. 3-4).  
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Personal information 
     The definition of “Personal information” has evolved considerably over the years (California 
A.B. 259, 2015; California A.B. 83, 2016; California A.B. 2182, 2018; California S.B. 576, 
2015; California A.B. 964, 2015; California S.B. 570, 2015; California A.B. 2828, 2016; 
California A.B. 2678, 2018; California S.B. 1121, 2018).  
     For the purposes of this study, the researcher has chosen the definition in California S.B. 1121 
(2018) to specify what is meant by personal information. The definition appears below: 
“Personal information” means information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of 
being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular 
consumer or household. Personal information includes, but is not limited to, the following if 
it identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could be reasonably 
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household:  
• Identifiers such as a real name, alias, postal address, unique personal identifier, online 
identifier, Internet Protocol address, email address, account name, social security 
number, driver’s license number, passport number, or other similar identifiers.  
• Characteristics of protected classifications under California or federal law.  
• Commercial information, including records of personal property, products or services 
purchased, obtained, or considered, or other purchasing or consuming histories or 
tendencies.  
• Biometric information.  
• Internet or other electronic network activity information, including, but not limited to, 
browsing history, search history, and information regarding a consumer’s interaction 
with an Internet Web site, application, or advertisement.  
• Geolocation data.  
• Audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar information.  
• Professional or employment-related information.  
• Education information, defined as information that is not publicly available 
personally identifiable information as defined in the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. section 1232g, 34 C.F.R. Part 99).  
• Inferences drawn from any of the information identified in this subdivision to create a 
profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences, characteristics, 
psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and 
aptitudes (pp. 18-19).  
      California requires a business to develop and enforce security procedures and practices 
necessary to protect the information it gathers on California residents from unauthorized “access, 
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure (California A.B. 83, 2016).” Furthermore, the 
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business must have a contract with a third party with whom it shares information that requires 
the third party to develop and enforce security procedures and practices necessary to protect the 
information it gathers on California residents from unauthorized “access, destruction, use, 
modification, or disclosure (California A.B. 83, 2016).” 
     Social security number security is also important. Proposed legislation would have made it 
unlawful for a business to electronically gather, store, or transmit an unencrypted social security 
number (California A.B. 322, 2015). Nor would a business be allowed to require a person to 
transmit their social security number over the internet unless: the connection is secure; or the 
social security number is encrypted (California A.B. 322, 2015). In addition, the social security 
number could not be used to access a web site unless it was one element of a two-factor 
authentication solution (California A.B. 322, 2015).  
     A business must tell consumers what categories of personal information will be collected, 
why it is being collected, and how it will be used before data collection begins. Furthermore, the 
business may not collect any other data without expressly notifying the user as above (California 
S.B. 1121, 2018).  
     California recognizes that its citizens value their privacy and want more control over their 
personal information (California A.B. 375, 2018). The California legislation believes that 
personal information can be better protected by a thorough and continuous examination of the 
methods by which it is gathered, used, managed, and shared (California H.R. 10, 2017). 
     Consumers require assurances that there are protections for their personal information, and 
they have access to and control over it (California A.B. 375, 2018). To that end, the California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 was enacted. It provides Californians the rights to: 
Know what personal information is being collected about them. 
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     A consumer can request information from a business that collects personal information about 
them. Examples include: which types and specific items of information were collected; why the 
information was collected; and what types of third parties the business shares the information 
with. 
     The business must provide the data free of charge and may deliver the data by mail or in 
electronic format – provided the data does not require any special software to read or transmit 
(California S.B. 1121, 2018). While a consumer may request this information at any time, the 
business is only required to provide the data a maximum of twice in any 12-month period 
(California S.B. 1121, 2018). 
Know whether their personal information is sold or disclosed and to whom. 
     A consumer can also request information from a business that sells personal information 
about them. Examples include: which types of the consumers’ personal information the business 
sold; and the names and types of third parties the business sold the information to, listed by 
category of information and name of purchaser (California S.B. 1121, 2018). 
     Once a third party has purchased a consumers’ information, they may not sell it to anyone 
else unless the consumer has received explicit notice and is provided an opportunity to exercise 
the right to opt out (California S.B. 1121, 2018; California A.B. 375, 2018).   
Say no to the sale of personal information. 
     A business that sells customers’ personal information must notify them, and also let them 
know they have the right to opt out (California S.B. 1121, 2018; California A.B. 375, 2018). 
     California grants consumers the right to opt out of having their personal information sold. A 
person has the right to tell a business at any time not to sell their personal information by 
clicking a link on their homepage named “Do Not Sell My Personal Information.” Once clicked, 
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the link directs the consumer to a page that allows them or an authorized representative to opt out 
of the sale of their personal information (California S.B. 1121, 2018; California A.B. 375, 2018). 
A business must also include an explanation of the consumers’ right to opt out in any online 
privacy policies or California-specific consumer rights disclosure (California S.B. 1121, 2018; 
California A.B. 375, 2018). Once directed to stop selling personal information, a business must 
immediately cease selling their information and may not sell any more until specifically 
authorized by the user (California S.B. 1121, 2018; California A.B. 375, 2018). 
     California also grants consumers the right to instruct businesses to delete their personal 
information at any time. Once directed to delete the consumer’s personal information, a business 
must immediately do so and direct any service providers to do the same (California S.B. 1121, 
2018). In some cases, a business must retain a consumer’s information, such as when it is 
necessary to (California S.B. 1121, 2018): 
• Complete the transaction for which the personal information was collected, provide a 
good or service requested by the consumer, or reasonably anticipated within the context 
of a business’s ongoing business relationship with the consumer, or otherwise perform a 
contract between the business and the consumer.  
• Detect security incidents, protect against malicious, deceptive, fraudulent, or illegal 
activity; or prosecute those responsible for that activity.  
• Engage in public or peer-reviewed scientific, historical, or statistical research in the 
public interest that adheres to all other applicable ethics and privacy laws, when the 
businesses’ deletion of the information is likely to render impossible or seriously impair 
the achievement of such research, if the consumer has provided informed consent.  
• Comply with a legal obligation (p. 6).  
 
A business is not required to honor the consumer’s request in these cases (California S.B. 1121, 
2018). 
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Access their personal information. 
     California law permits a person to review their personal information that a data broker has 
collected about them – free of charge – by submitting a request online through a secure system 
(California S.B. 1348, 2014).   
Equal service and price, even if they exercise their privacy rights. 
     A consumer who exercises their privacy rights may not be discriminated against in any way. 
Some examples of discriminatory behavior include (California S.B. 1121, 2018): 
• Denying goods or services. 
• Charging a different price, adjusting discounts or benefits, or assessing penalties. 
• A different level or quality of goods or services. 
• Implying any of the above (p. 9). 
 
     Commercial health monitoring programs are also a concern. An operator of a commercial 
health monitoring program must notify – and obtain consent from – the user before sharing or 
selling the user’s personally identifiable health information. The request must be separate from 
any other consent request, specify the name/nature of the third party, and specify the reason for 
the request. The user must also be notified of the process to withdraw consent (California A.B. 
2688, 2016). The user also has the right to review the personally identifiable health information 
the commercial health monitoring program keeps about them, and to instruct them to delete it. 
Unlike other entities that are forbidden from assessing charges for providing or deleting 
customer information, the operator of a commercial health monitoring program may charge a 
“reasonable administrative” fee for it (California A.B. 2688, 2016).  
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Policies, procedures, and standards 
     The California Legislature is committed to adopting uniform standards for the purpose of 
storing and recording public records and other documents electronically and have directed the 
guidelines and standards set by the American National Standards Institute be adopted statewide 
(California A.B. 22, 2017; California A.B. 2225, 2018). These standards require the use of a 
trusted system (California A.B. 22, 2017). According to the California state legislature: 
A cloud computing storage service that complies with International Organization for 
Standardization ISO/IEC 27001:2013, or other applicable industry-recognized standard 
relating to security techniques and information security management and provides 
administrative users with controls to prevent stored records from being overwritten, 
deleted, or altered shall be considered a trusted system (California A.B. 22, 2017, p. 2). 
 
     Cloud-based storage and service solutions can provide productive and practical information 
technology solutions for local government agencies in daily operations and disaster recovery 
scenarios (California A.B. 2812, 2018). The distributed architecture can help reduce the chances 
of a single agency losing its data or going dark after a natural disaster (California A.B. 2812, 
2018).   
     There have been additional bills and offices that analyze the current information technology 
environment and establish procedures and standards for providing protection to critical data 
systems. 
     One proposed article of California legislation would have required the office of information 
security – not later than July 1, 2019 – to review current state agency information security 
technologies in place to determine if existing policies, procedures, and standards provide 
sufficient protection in the current information technology security environment (California A.B. 
531, 2017). The office would then have been required to develop a plan to implement any 
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changes it deems necessary to adequately protect the information technology in place (California 
A.B. 531, 2017).  
     The California Open Data Standard (California A.B. 1215, 2015) was proposed to accomplish 
a multitude of tasks. Among the most notable: 
1. On or before March 1, 2016, the Chief Data Officer shall prepare and publish a technical 
standards manual for publishing public data through the Internet Web portal by state 
agencies for the purpose of making public data available to the greatest number of users 
and for the greatest number of applications and shall, whenever practicable, use open 
standards for Internet Web publishing in a machine-readable format. 
2. The manual shall identify the policy for each technical standard and specify which types 
of data the standard applies to, and may recommend or require that public data be 
published in more than one technical standard. The manual shall include a plan to adopt 
or utilize an Internet Web application programming interface that permits application 
programs to request and receive public data directly from the Internet Web portal. The 
manual and related policies may be updated as necessary (p. 5). 
     
State agencies are always trying to find ways to enhance and improve their transparency, 
efficiency, and disaster response preparedness (California A.B. 2812, 2018). The Office of Local 
Cloud Migration and Digital Innovation in the Department of Technology was proposed to assist 
in these efforts by finding ways to integrate technologies such as cloud-based solutions. The 
office was also intended to help the agency find ways to be more accessible to the public 
(California A.B. 2812, 2018). 
     The California Department of Technology is part of the Government Operations Agency. It is 
supervised by the Directory of Technology, who is also known as the State Chief Information 
Officer. Proposed legislation would identify the duties of the Chief Information Officer to 
include:  
• Advising the Governor on the strategic management and direction of the state’s 
information technology resources. 
• Establishing and enforcing state information technology strategic plans, policies, 
standards, and enterprise architecture. The Director of Technology shall consult with the 
Director of General Services, the Director of Finance, and other relevant agencies 
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concerning policies and standards these agencies are responsible to issue as they relate to 
information technology. 
• Providing technology direction to agency and department chief information officers to 
ensure the integration of statewide technology initiatives, compliance with information 
technology policies and standards, and the promotion of the alignment and effective 
management of information technology services.  
• Establishing performance management and improvement processes to ensure state 
information technology systems and services are efficient and effective. 
• Approving, suspending, terminating, and reinstating information technology projects. 
• Developing and tailoring baseline security controls for the state based on emerging 
industry standards and baseline security controls published by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST). The Director of Technology shall review and revise 
the state baseline security controls whenever the NIST updates its baseline security 
controls or advancing industry standards warrant but, in no event, less frequently than 
once every year. State agencies shall comply with the state baseline security controls and 
shall not tailor their individual baseline security controls to fall below the state baseline 
security controls (California A.B. 650, 2017, pp. 2-3). 
 
     The California Office of Information Security is a part of the Department of technology. It is 
supervised by the Chief of the Office of Information Security and is responsible for approving 
and overseeing information technology projects. California A.B. 670 (2015) states that the Office 
of Information Security is authorized to: 
• perform or direct independent security assessments of any state entity at the expense of 
the entity being assessed. 
• perform or direct information security program audits – at the expense of the entity being 
audited – to ensure compliance. 
Furthermore, California A.B. 670 (2015) states that the Office of Information Security is 
required to: 
• work with the Office of Emergency Services to order – at a minimum – 35 independent 
security assessments of state entities each year and “determine basic standards of services 
to be performed as part of an independent security assessment” (California A.B. 670, 
2015, p. 3). The results of the assessment are provided to both the Office of Information 
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Security and the Office of Emergency Services. Because the assessment results contain 
detailed information about vulnerabilities of critical systems, their release is only 
authorized to employees and contractors with job-related requirements. 
• work with the Office of Emergency Services in ranking state entities according to 
information security risk. 
• report entities that are not compliant with information security requirements to the 
Department of Technology and the Office of Emergency Services. 
• notify the “Office of Emergency Services, Department of the California Highway Patrol, 
and the Department of Justice of any criminal or alleged criminal cyber activity affecting 
any state entity or critical infrastructure of state government” (California A.B. 670, 2015, 
p. 4).  
 
Security breach notification 
     California law requires any person, business, or agency who maintains personal information 
in electronic format to take appropriate steps to protect the security of the information from 
unauthorized “access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure” (California A.B. 739, 2016, 
p. 1). This applies in cases where the data was unencrypted, as well as when it was encrypted, 
and the encryption key was compromised or believed to be compromised (California A.B. 2828, 
2016). The notification must be written in plain language and all information must be listed 
under specific headings. A sample notification breach form is provided (California S.B. 570, 
2015). If an agency was the source of the breach, it must offer to provide identity theft 
prevention services for free for a minimum of 12 months (California A.B. 259, 2015). 
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     California law requires security breach notice be provided in one of three ways: written, 
electronic, or substitute notice (California A.B. 2182, 2018; California A.B. 964, 2015; 
California S.B. 570, 2015; California A.B. 2828, 2016; California A.B. 2678, 2018). 
     Substitute notice may be used when: it would cost more than $250,000 to provide notice; if 
there are more than 500,000 people to be notified; or the agency does not have all the necessary 
contact information to make the required written or electronic notice. The notice must be 
delivered: via email notice (if the email addresses are known); and be prominently posted on the 
agency’s Web page (if it has one) for at least 30 days; and  
major statewide media and the Office of Information Security must be notified (California S.B. 
570, 2015; California A.B. 964, 2015; California A.B. 2828, 2016).  
     California law provides specific requirements for security breach notification, and even 
provides a sample notification form. Specifically, the format and content of the notification itself 
must meet the following requirements as specified in California A.B. 2182 (2018):  
The notification must: 
• Be written in plain language. 
• Be titled “Notice of Data Breach.”  
• Organize the following information under the headings “What Happened,” “What 
Information Was Involved,” “What We Are Doing,” “What You Can Do,” and “For 
More Information:”  
o The name and contact information of the reporting person or business subject 
to this section.  
o A list of the types of personal information that were or are reasonably 
believed to have been the subject of a breach.  
o If the information is possible to determine at the time the notice is provided, 
then any of the following: 
 the date of the breach. 
 the estimated date of the breach, or  
 the date range within which the breach occurred.  
o The notification shall also include the date of the notice. 
o Whether notification was delayed as a result of a law enforcement 
investigation, if that information is possible to determine at the time the notice 
is provided. 
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o A general description of the breach incident, if that information is possible to 
determine at the time the notice is provided. 
o The toll-free telephone numbers and addresses of the major credit reporting 
agencies if the breach exposed a social security number or a driver’s license or 
California identification card number. 
o If the person or business providing the notification was the source of the 
breach, an offer to provide appropriate identity theft prevention and mitigation 
services, if any, shall be provided at no cost to the affected person for not less 
than 12 months along with all information necessary to take advantage of the 
offer to any person whose information was or may have been breached if the 
breach exposed or may have exposed personal information. 
• Additional information may be provided as a supplement to the notice. Examples 
include: 
o Information about what the person or business has done to protect individuals 
whose information has been breached. 
o Advice on steps that the person whose information has been breached may 
take to protect himself or herself. 
• The title and headings must be clearly visible and easily recognizable, and text must 
use at a minimum 10-point type (pp. 3-5). 
 
     An entity is considered complaint with requirements for written notice if they either: use the 
model security breach notification form in California A.B. 2182 (2018); or they use the headings 
and information in California A.B. 2182 (2018) previously described here. An entity is 
considered compliant with requirements for providing electronic notice if they use the headings 
and information in California A.B. 2182 (2018) previously described above.    
     If the security breach notification exceeds 500 California residents for a single incident, the 
person or business must submit an electronic copy of the security breach notification (without 
personally identifiable information) to the Attorney General (California A.B. 2182, 2018; 
California A.B. 964, 2015; California S.B. 570, 2015; California A.B. 2828, 2016; California 
A.B. 2678, 2018). 
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Web site policies 
     According to California law, anyone operating a commercial web site or online service that 
collects personally identifiable information about consumers residing in California who use or 
visit that site is required to post – and comply with – its privacy policy on that site (California 
S.B. 1348, 2014; California A.B. 1950, 2018). Those notified of noncompliance have 30 days to 
post their policy (California A.B. 1950, 2018). Data brokers are subject to law as well, as they 
must permit an individual to review their personal information and provide them with the option 
to opt-out of having their information shared or sold. The law requires an opt-out notice be 
clearly displayed on the web site and contain clear instructions for the user to opt out (California 
S.B. 1348, 2014). Once received, the data broker must – at no cost to the user – honor the request 
as expeditiously as possible and may no longer retain any information beyond that which is 
absolutely necessary to provide the services requested by the user (California S.B. 1348, 2014).  
     California law sets clear requirements for privacy policies. According to California A.B. 1950 
(2018): 
The privacy policy … shall do all of the following: 
• Identify the categories of personally identifiable information that the operator collects 
. . . and the categories of third-party persons or entities with whom the operator may 
share that personally identifiable information. 
• If the operator maintains a process for an individual consumer who uses or visits its 
commercial Web site or online service to review and request changes to any of his or 
her personally identifiable information that is collected through the Web site or online 
service, provide a description of that process. 
• Describe the process by which the operator notifies consumers who use or visit its 
commercial Web site or online service of material changes to the operator’s privacy 
policy for that Web site or online service. 
• Identify its effective date. 
• Disclose how the operator responds to Web browser “do not track” signals or other 
mechanisms. 
• Disclose whether other parties may collect personally identifiable information. 
• Disclose whether the operator utilizes bots for the dissemination of information, and 
that bots are software that, for purposes of this section, can execute commands, reply 
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to messages, gather information, or perform routine tasks such as online searches, 
either automatically or with minimal human intervention. 
• An operator may satisfy the requirement . . . by providing a clear and conspicuous 
hyperlink in the operator’s privacy policy to an online location containing a 
description, including the effects, of any program or protocol the operator follows that 
offers the consumer that choice (p. 3). 
 
Summary 
     The results of the study are discussed in this chapter. This study was conducted from May 7 
to December 12, 2018. A Boolean search of the literature was initially used but proved 
ineffective due to duplicate records and other irrelevant data. The researcher further consulted 
the legislative site for California and found legislative archives listing each bill presented for 
consideration by topic for each legislative year available. Using this new method, the researcher 
was able to gather a much richer pool of data from which to draw.  
     The researcher analyzed and coded the legislation gathered. Seven themes emerged as a result 
of the coding process: 
• Aging in place, 
• Computer crimes, 
• Mobile devices and applications, 
• Personal information, 
• Policies, procedures, and standards, 
• Security breach notification, and 
• Web site policies. 
Aging in place 
     California recognizes that the American population is aging at an increasing rate, and that 
family support is critical in permitting seniors to continue living independent and product lives. 
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Over the years, efforts such as the California Task Force on Family Caregiving, the Dignity at 
Home and Fall Prevention Program, and Community-based Adult Services (CBAS) have been 
put in place to aid seniors and family members both in providing services, support, and care. 
Computer crimes 
     Seniors and dependent adults may be particularly vulnerable to computer crime. In some 
cases, it may be difficult for someone to adequately identify attempts to take advantage of them 
or report suspect behavior if medications or impairments are affecting the person’s memory or 
ability to concentrate. The California Attorney General’s web site contains a warning notice 
about the dangers of fraud against seniors and dependent adults and gives guidance filing 
complaints. Laws have also been passed adding stricter punishment for crimes against seniors. 
California law addresses other types of computer crime as well. Confidential communications, 
identity theft, impersonation – both live and via bot, physical and constructive invasion of 
privacy, and ransomware are all examples of crimes the California legislature has provided 
protection against for its residents.  
Mobile devices and applications 
     California legislators also recognize the importance of protecting mobile devices and the 
applications and data they contain. Devices and applications containing such data as geolocation, 
health, or personal information require protection by various means. Examples include requiring 
advance disclosure and consent prior to install; the capability to disable features and capabilities 
if lost or stolen; the ability to decrypt the contents under court order; and protecting against 
access, change, and deletion from unauthorized users. Protection of user data has also expanded 
to include commercial health-monitoring systems – requiring clear notice to – and consent from 
– the user prior to disclosure. 
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Personal information 
     “Personal information” is information that either identifies or could be used to identify an 
individual. California requires a business to notify users of the categories, purpose and use of the 
personal information it collects prior to collection and may not collect any other data without 
additional notice and consent. Furthermore, the business is required to have a contract with any 
third party they share the information with to ensure appropriate security procedures and 
practices are in place to protect the data as well. The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 
allows California residents to: know what personal information is being collected about them; 
know whether their personal information is sold or disclosed and to whom; say no to the sale of 
personal information; access their personal information; and receive equal service and price, 
even if they exercise their privacy rights. 
Policies, procedures, and standards 
     The California Office of Information Security is a part of the Department of technology. It is 
supervised by the Chief of the Office of Information Security and is responsible for approving 
and overseeing information technology projects. Its duties include ordering independent security 
assessments of state entities; ranking state entities according to information security risk; and 
notifying other agencies of confirmed or suspected criminal cyber activity against entities or 
infrastructure.  
Security breach notification 
     California law requires any person, business, or agency who maintains personal information 
in electronic format to take appropriate steps to protect the security of the information and to 
provide proper notification in the case of a breach. California law requires security breach notice 
be provided in one of three ways: written, electronic, or substitute notice. Substitute notice may 
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be used when: it would cost more than $250,000 to provide notice; if there are more than 
500,000 people to be notified; or the agency does not have all the necessary contact information 
to make the required written or electronic notice. If more than 500 California residents are 
involved in a single incident, an electronic copy of the security breach notification (with PII 
removed) must be provided to the Attorney General. 
Web site policies 
     California law requires commercial web site or online service operators that collect PII on 
California residents to post and comply with its privacy policy. Other legislation ensures that 
individuals are permitted to review their personal data and opt-it of having it shared or sold. 
Privacy policy requirements are also clearly established. Examples include: the categories of 
personally identifiable information collected; the effective date; is the information shared with 
third parties; and how “do not track” browser commands are handled.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
Introduction 
     The goal of this study was to conduct an exploratory study of existing legislation to learn 
what was being done at the legislative level to protect the security and privacy of users using in-
home mobile health monitoring systems. Specifically, those developed and maintained by 
organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). This chapter presents the conclusions of 
this study, and also discusses the implications and limitations of the study, along with 
recommendations for future studies. 
 
Conclusions 
     This work explored existing legislation to learn what was being done at the legislative level to 
protect the privacy of user data collected, stored, and transmitted by systems or applications 
developed by entities not covered under existing federal regulations. Specifically, it addressed 
the risks to seniors relying on in-home health monitoring systems to provide maintenance and 
early warning of health problems. The literature review revealed that such systems show promise 
in the home monitoring environment, but they are not without risk. The use of smartphones, 
home networks, and downloadable apps puts patient privacy at risk (Jiya, 2016), and combining 
systems that were not initially intended to function together carries additional concerns. Different 
privacy protection profiles (Calhoun et al., 2012), opt-in/opt-out defaults (Bellman et al., 2001) 
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and privacy policies that are difficult to read (Burkell & Fortier, 2013b; Bustos-Jiménez, 2014) 
or are not adhered to by the application (Njie, 2016) also put user data at risk.  
     The current legislation is complex in both language and scope. Developers may never be fully 
confident that they are in compliance (Varshney, 2007) due to different interpretations of the 
regulations, and users may incorrectly assume that a device or app is protected under federal 
regulations because the FDA labeled it a “medically regulated device” or a “medical app” (Brzan 
et al., 2016). 
     Some states have already begun passing legislation to protect patient data at a level beyond 
what federal regulations require. While some similarities exist, there is no uniformity across 
states regarding such protection (Health Information & the Law, 2016b).   
     Three research questions guided this study. Each question is addressed based on the 
legislation discovered through the five-year search through the state records.  
RQ 1: What legislation did California have in place governing the development and maintenance 
of the technology used with mobile in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained 
by organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities under HIPAA? 
     The researcher examined legislation from each of the seven themes identified during the 
examination of California state legislation: 
• Aging in place, 
• Computer crimes, 
• Mobile devices and applications, 
• Personal information, 
• Policies, procedures, and standards, 
• Security breach notification, and 
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• Web site policies. 
     While this examination showed that there is legislative support governing the development of 
the technology of individual components of the in-home health monitoring systems (e.g., 
smartphones, wearable medical devices, sensors, recording devices, etc.), it appears that the in-
home health monitoring system as a whole is an immature technology and not in wide enough 
use to warrant legislative attention.  
RQ2: What legislation did California have in place to protect the privacy of seniors using mobile 
in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained by organizations or individuals 
not classified as covered entities under HIPAA? 
     Unlike the challenges posed by the development and maintenance of the technology of in-
home health monitoring systems, there is actually ample legislation to protect user privacy in 
mobile in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained by those not classified as 
covered entities under HIPAA. California law considers a business or person acting as a covered 
entity to be a covered entity under certain conditions. In addition, since there is so much privacy 
law covering the individual components of the system – going so far as to include the user’s 
domicile – that the privacy of the system itself would not be compromised if deployed as 
suggested in this study.  
RQ3: What was the required technical and legal expertise California needed to develop and 
enforce such legislation? 
     There is no indication that a state requires any additional expertise – technical or legal – to 
develop and enforce such legislation. The legislation evaluated over the course of this study 
demonstrated consistent balance between technical, theoretical, and legal stakeholders.  
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Limitations 
     As with any study, this study had limitations. One limitation of this study is that it was a 
single-case study focusing on California. An analysis of legislation in other states and regions of 
the United States may yield different perspectives and attitudes, particularly regarding the 
maturity of in-home health monitoring systems and the appropriateness of regulating them as a 
whole. Another limitation of this study was the number of participants. Although the interviews 
yielded rich data, the number of participants was far less than expected. While this may have 
been a result of the study being conducted during an election year and the subsequent turnover of 
legislators and staff, future studies would do well to consider the time of year when seeking 
participants. A third limitation was the time-constraint placed on the data gathering effort of this 
study. This study had the potential to amass a large amount of data, and so it was necessary to 
define a point at which the study was considered complete. In the case of the literature review, 
the data was limited to a period of not more than five years. There are pieces of legislation that 
were not passed during the time of this study that may be reintroduced in whole or as part of a 
companion bill and may become law. 
 
 Implications 
Contribution to Literature 
     Extant literature recognizes the importance of leveraging mobile technologies as a means of 
assisting independent living and in-home health monitoring of senior patients (Díaz-Bossini & 
Moreno, 2014; Reeder et al., 2015), but there are concerns that the protection of patient data 
might suffer in the interest of technological advancement (Armontrout et al., 2016; Martínez-
Pérez et al., 2014). Current federal regulations only cover applications and systems developed for 
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use by covered entities and their business partners (Paul & Irvine, 2014; Yang & Silverman, 
2014), leaving individual states responsible for the protection of individuals using health 
monitoring apps obtained from open markets. Current literary guidance and regulations 
concerning privacy of mHealth applications is sparse and confusing, and researchers and 
clinicians alike are calling for more standardized guidance to enable developers, clinicians, and 
users to better leverage mHealth technology while preserving privacy and adhering to legal 
requirements (Armontrout et al., 2016; Health Information & the Law, 2016a; Lewis & Wyatt, 
2014). Indeed, there is a call for more work in the area privacy protection for users’ data that is 
collected, stored, and transmitted (Brzan et al., 2016; Martínez-Pérez et al., 2014; Varshney, 
2014; Yang & Silverman, 2014).  
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in this area by conducting an in-depth review of 
current and proposed legislation in the state of California for the past five years. The results will 
help provide future direction for researchers and developers as they struggle to meet the current 
and future needs of patients using this technology as it matures.  
Practical Application 
     There are practical applications for this study as well. The seven themes identified during this 
study can serve as a valuable starting point for state legislators to evaluate existing and proposed 
legislation within the context of medical data to identify the need for legislation to assist in 
protecting user data against fraud, identity theft, and other damaging consequences that occur 
because of a data breach.  
 
  
76 
Recommendations 
     Three areas of future research were identified. First, this study was limited to a single-case 
study focusing on California. Future studies would benefit from expanding the study to include 
other states or geographic regions. Second, only two of the original 14 participants originally 
identified actually participated in the study. Given the difficulty in identifying and securing 
participants, future studies might have more success by employing a more general selection 
criteria for recruiting participants. For example, participants might be more successfully 
recruited by identifying the committee(s) or subcommittee(s) that are involved in key legislation 
and contacting the members to elicit their participation as opposed to focusing only on the 
sponsor of the bill. Lastly, this study was originally designed as a two-state case study consisting 
of California and Florida but had to be changed to a single-state case study due to a lack of 
sufficient data from the state legislative website and inability to locate participants from Florida 
within the specified timeframe. Future studies could stipulate longer data gathering time and 
produce a study involving multiple states. 
 
Summary  
     The goal of this study was to conduct an exploratory study of existing legislation to learn 
what was being done at the legislative level to protect the security and privacy of users using in-
home mobile health monitoring systems. Specifically, those developed and maintained by 
organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). This chapter presented the conclusions of 
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this study, and also discussed the implications and limitations of the study, along with 
recommendations for future studies. 
     The literature review revealed that such systems show promise in the home monitoring 
environment, but they are not without risk. The use of smartphones, home networks, and 
downloadable apps puts patient privacy at risk (Jiya, 2016), and combining systems that were not 
initially intended to function together carries additional concerns. Different privacy protection 
profiles (Calhoun et al., 2012), opt-in/opt-out defaults (Bellman et al., 2001) and privacy policies 
that are difficult to read (Burkell & Fortier, 2013b; Bustos-Jiménez, 2014) or are not adhered to 
by the application (Njie, 2016) also put user data at risk.  
     The three research questions were also discussed.  
RQ 1: What legislation did California have in place governing the development and maintenance 
of the technology used with mobile in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained 
by organizations or individuals not classified as covered entities under HIPAA? 
     While this examination showed that there is legislative support governing the development of 
the technology of individual components of the in-home health monitoring systems (e.g., 
smartphones, wearable medical devices, sensors, recording devices, etc.), it appears that the in-
home health monitoring system as a whole is an immature technology and not in wide enough 
use to warrant legislative attention.  
RQ2: What legislation did California have in place to protect the privacy of seniors using mobile 
in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained by organizations or individuals 
not classified as covered entities under HIPAA? 
     Unlike the challenges posed by the development and maintenance of the technology of in-
home health monitoring systems, there is actually ample legislation to protect user privacy in 
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mobile in-home health monitoring systems developed and maintained by those not classified as 
covered entities under HIPAA. California law considers a business or person acting as a covered 
entity to be a covered entity under certain conditions. In addition, the volume of privacy law 
covering the individual components of the system – going so far as to include the user’s domicile 
– is such that the privacy of the system itself would not be compromised if deployed as 
suggested in this study.  
RQ3: What was the required technical and legal expertise California needed to develop and 
enforce such legislation? 
     There was no indication that a state required any additional expertise – technical or legal – to 
develop and enforce such legislation. The legislation evaluated over the course of this study 
demonstrated consistent balance between technical, theoretical, and legal stakeholders. 
     This study contributes to the body of knowledge in this area by conducting an in-depth review 
of current and proposed legislation in the state of California for the past five years. The results 
will help provide future direction for researchers and developers as they struggle to meet the 
current and future needs of patients using this technology as it matures. There are practical 
applications for this study as well. The seven themes identified during this study can serve as a 
valuable starting point for state legislators to evaluate existing and proposed legislation within 
the context of medical data to identify the need for legislation to assist in protecting user data 
against fraud, identity theft, and other damaging consequences that occur because of a data 
breach. 
     Three areas of future research were identified. First, expanding the study to include other 
states or geographic regions. Second, recruiting participants by identifying the committee(s) or 
subcommittee(s) that are involved in key legislation and contacting the members to elicit their 
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participation as opposed to focusing only on the sponsor of the bill. Lastly, conducting a 
multiple-case study by stipulating a longer data gathering time. 
     The senior population is growing and is expected to exceed 2 billion by the year 2050 
(Vuorimaa et al., 2012). Extant literature shows that seniors prefer living at home rather than in a 
care facility (Vuorimaa et al., 2012), which will place a heavy burden on personal caregivers and 
family members as current healthcare technology remains mainly limited to hospital, assisted 
living facilities, and hospice care. As healthcare costs skyrocket and resources become depleted, 
researchers are calling for the development of a new healthcare model that better addresses these 
concerns (Dickerson et al., 2011). This work explored existing legislation to learn what was 
being done at the legislative level to protect the privacy of user data collected, stored, and 
transmitted by systems or applications developed by entities not covered under existing federal 
regulations. Specifically, it addressed the risks to seniors relying on in-home health monitoring 
systems to provide maintenance and early warning of health problems. While this study showed 
that there is considerable legislative support governing both the development of the technology 
of individual components and the privacy of those using in-home health monitoring systems, the 
in-home health monitoring system as a whole is an immature technology and not in wide enough 
use to warrant specific legislative attention. Furthermore, there is no indication that a state 
requires any additional expertise – technical or legal – to develop and enforce such legislation. 
The results of this study can serve as a valuable starting point for state legislators to evaluate 
existing and proposed legislation within the context of medical data to identify the need for 
legislation to assist in protecting user data.  
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Appendix A 
IRB Approval 
 
MEMORANDUM 
 
To:  Robert L Saganich, M.S. IST, B.S. CIS 
   
 
From:  Ling Wang, Ph.D.,    
  Center Representative, Institutional Review Board 
  
Date:  November 7, 2017 
 
Re: IRB #:  2017-642; Title, “Toward a unified framework of electronic 
Protected Health Information (e-PHI) privacy protection for seniors – An 
examination of privacy policy legislation within the United States for in-home 
health monitoring systems” 
 
I have reviewed the above-referenced research protocol at the center level.  Based on 
the information provided, I have determined that this study is exempt from further IRB 
review under 45 CFR 46.101(b) ( Exempt Category 2).  You may proceed with your 
study as described to the IRB.  As principal investigator, you must adhere to the 
following requirements: 
 
1) CONSENT:  If recruitment procedures include consent forms, they must be 
obtained in such a manner that they are clearly understood by the subjects and 
the process affords subjects the opportunity to ask questions, obtain detailed 
answers from those directly involved in the research, and have sufficient time to 
consider their participation after they have been provided this information.  The 
subjects must be given a copy of the signed consent document, and a copy must 
be placed in a secure file separate from de-identified participant information.  
Record of informed consent must be retained for a minimum of three years from 
the conclusion of the study. 
2) ADVERSE EVENTS/UNANTICIPATED PROBLEMS:  The principal investigator 
is required to notify the IRB chair and me (954-262-5369 and Ling Wang, Ph.D., 
respectively) of any adverse reactions or unanticipated events that may develop 
as a result of this study.  Reactions or events may include, but are not limited to, 
injury, depression as a result of participation in the study, life-threatening 
situation, death, or loss of confidentiality/anonymity of subject.  Approval may be 
withdrawn if the problem is serious. 
3) AMENDMENTS:  Any changes in the study (e.g., procedures, number or types of 
subjects, consent forms, investigators, etc.) must be approved by the IRB prior to 
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implementation.  Please be advised that changes in a study may require further 
review depending on the nature of the change.  Please contact me with any 
questions regarding amendments or changes to your study. 
The NSU IRB is in compliance with the requirements for the protection of human 
subjects prescribed in Part 46 of Title 45 of the Code of Federal Regulations (45 CFR 
46) revised June 18, 1991. 
 
Cc: Maxine Cohen, Ph.D. 
 Ling Wang, Ph.D. 
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Appendix B 
Participant Questionnaire  
 
Introduction 
     This research will examine the present and proposed state privacy legislation within 
California to identify those electronic Protected Health Information (e-PHI) privacy policies that 
are suited to seniors using in-home health monitoring systems. Personal freedom and 
independence are essential to a person's physical and mental health, and mobile technology 
applications provide a convenient and economical method for monitoring personal health. Many 
of these apps are written by third parties, however, which poses serious risks to patient privacy. 
Current federal regulations only cover applications and systems developed for use by covered 
entities and their business partners. As a result, the responsibility for protecting the privacy of the 
individual using health monitoring apps obtained from the open market falls squarely on the 
states.  
     This work explores the viability of providing a conceptual framework for states to use when 
developing legislation to protect the privacy of user data collected, stored, and transmitted by 
systems or applications developed by entities not covered under existing federal regulations. 
Specifically, it addresses the risks to seniors relying on in-home health monitoring systems to 
provide maintenance and early warning of health problems. The legislation made possible by 
such a framework will enable the enforcement of privacy protections that protect the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the user's data. Also, the additional measures 
required by these laws will provide greater protection against fraud, identity theft, and other 
damaging consequences that occur because of a data breach.  
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     Please consider the following information when answering question 1: 
     In-home health monitoring systems rely heavily on mobile devices and applications, and a 
number of bills have been presented that are directed at protecting users from exploitation. 
Topics of particular interest are: implementing a universal privacy policy for application 
developers (California A.B. 1192, 2015) ; requiring notification and user consent before 
gathering/sharing geolocation data (California S.B. 576, 2015) ; requiring commercial health 
monitoring programs to provide clear notice and obtain user consent before sharing, selling, or 
disclosing their information (California A.B. 2688, 2016) ; and requiring smartphones and other 
devices be equipped with security features to prevent unauthorized access and disclosure of 
information in the case of loss or theft (California A.B. 1906, 2018; California A.B. 2167, 2018).   
1. Are you aware of any other legislation (either current or proposed) that might provide the 
same or similar protection of mobile devices or medical monitoring devices?  
 
     Please consider the following information when answering question 2: 
     Several pieces of legislation expand the definition of “Biometric Information” (California 
A.B. 83, 2016; California A.B. 375, 2018) to include items that can be used to identify a person’s 
gait, sleep, or even exercise patterns. This would seem to fit nicely into the arena of in-home 
health monitoring systems, as they often use such items to determine a change in a person’s 
behavior and alert to a possible problem.  
2. Are you aware of any other legislation (either current or proposed) covering the use of 
biometric information on mobile devices, specifically apps that collect, store, and 
transmit protected health information? 
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Please consider the following information when answering questions 3 and 4: 
     California remains committed to the protecting the security and independence of seniors 
(California A.C.R. 38, 2015; California A.C.R. 49, 2015; California S.B. 1026, 2018) are just 
some examples of the state’s commitment to supporting seniors and their families, and to ensure 
seniors have the resources and protections necessary to remain independent and living in their 
homes for as long as possible. 
     In-home health monitoring systems run the gamut from simple wearable devices to hybrid 
systems capable of interfacing via smartphone or home wi-fi with cameras, microphones, and 
other sensors placed throughout the home and on/in the body. For the purposes of this study we 
are focusing only on those systems created by independent third parties not affiliated with 
medical companies and not classified as covered entities under HIPAA.   
3. Are you aware of any other legislation (either current or proposed) governing the 
development and maintenance of the technology used (e.g., encryption, transmission 
standards, tamper alarms) of in-home health monitoring systems? 
 
4. Are you aware of any legislation (either current or proposed) governing the privacy of 
users of mobile in-home health monitoring systems? 
 
Please consider the following information when answering question 5: 
     Current literary guidance and regulations concerning privacy of mHealth applications is 
sparse and confusing, and researchers and clinicians alike are calling for more standardized 
guidance to enable developers, clinicians, and users to better leverage mHealth technology while 
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preserving privacy and adhering to legal requirements (Armontrout et al., 2016; Health 
Information & the Law, 2016a; Lewis & Wyatt, 2014). 
5. In your opinion, are in-home health monitoring systems as a whole mature enough to 
warrant legislative attention, or is it better to remain focused on the individual 
components (e.g., smartphones, wearable monitors, and sensors) until they become more 
widely used? 
 
     
This concludes the questions for this study. Thank you so much for your participation!  
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Appendix C 
Interview Data 
 
     This study had the potential to amass a large amount of data, and so it was necessary to define 
a point at which the study was considered complete. In the case of the literature review, the data 
was limited to a period of not more than five years and within the scope defined by this study (e-
PHI privacy policies best suited to seniors using in-home health monitoring systems). State 
legislation was broken down into two parts: a review of data available from the state legislative 
web sites (http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/legIndexTosaTemplate.xhtml, and 
http://www.legislature.ca.gov/bill_index2.html), data obtained from state archives and libraries 
(when necessary), and interviews with state legislators. Obtaining information in this manner 
could potentially take a significant amount of time, and so data collection terminated after 90 
days and included a log of information obtained, by whom, and if data collection was terminated 
due to no response or inability to access the archival data. This information was included in the 
analysis section as a caveat to provide clarification and to prevent confusion when data collection 
was terminated due to no response. 
     The researcher conducted personal interviews with members of the state senate and assembly. 
The researcher ensured the participants were aware that their privacy and security were of utmost 
concern, and that no information about them or their answers could or would be tied back to 
them. The researcher also ensured the participants were aware that they had the right to refuse to 
answer any questions and to terminate the interview at any time without explanation. The 
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researcher took field notes of the telephone interview that were kept confidential and stored 
separately along with the written submission. 
 
Instrument development and validation 
     The researcher identified eight legislators who contributed the most to the topics relevant to 
this study and reached out to their state capitol offices via telephone at the number listed on the 
California senate web site. Four of the eight declined, three agreed to a written form of the 
questions, and one agreed to a telephone interview.  
     The researcher then created the questionnaire (Appendix B) and sent it out to all four 
respondents. The questionnaire consisted of five open-ended questions (Appendix B) mapped to 
the research questions and was designed for use with both written and telephone participants.  
     The first question was mapped to RQ2 and focused on the extent to which in-home health 
monitoring systems relied on mobile devices and applications. The participants were presented 
with some background information for context and asked if they were aware of any current or 
proposed legislation that might provide that type of protection to medical monitoring systems.  
     The second question was also mapped to RQ2 and focused on biometric information. The 
participants were once again presented background information for context and asked if they 
were aware of any current or proposed legislation covering the use of biometric information on 
mobile devices, specifically apps that collect, store, and transmit protected health information.  
     The third question was mapped to RQ1 and focused on the technology of the in-home health 
monitoring systems themselves. The participants were asked if they were aware of any current or 
proposed legislation governing the development and maintenance of the technology used in such 
systems.  
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     The fourth question mapped to RQ1 and focused on the privacy of the user’s data on the in-
home health monitoring systems. The participants were asked if they were aware of any current 
or proposed legislation in this area.  
     The fifth question mapped to RQ3 and focused on in-home health monitoring systems as a 
whole. The participants were asked their opinion on whether or not in-home health monitoring 
systems as a whole were mature enough to warrant legislative attention or was it better to remain 
focused on the individual components. 
 
Data analysis 
     The researcher conducted a descriptive case study drawing from Terrell (2016) to conduct 
data analysis. The researcher began with an extensive review of the literature from the Internet, 
and also conducted interviews with state legislators. The researcher reviewed notes gathered 
from interviews to ensure accuracy. Once completed, the researcher analyzed and coded data 
from published sources and interview participants to identify patterns, concepts, and 
relationships.  
 
Survey results 
     The survey consisted of five open-ended questions mapped to the research questions being 
explored in this study (Appendix B). The same format was used for written and telephone 
participants. The survey and results are described below: 
     The first question was mapped to RQ2 and focused on the extent to which in-home health 
monitoring systems relied on mobile devices and applications. The introduction presented four 
topics of interest and some examples of legislation relevant to each topic. The participant was 
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then asked if they were aware of any current or proposed legislation that might provide that type 
of protection to medical monitoring systems. Respondent A-1 was not aware of any such 
legislation in the works. Respondent A-2 mentioned “technical corrections” to the California 
Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 but was not aware of any additional legislation in the works. 
     The second question was also mapped to RQ2 and focused on biometric information. The 
scenario was given of how aggregated data from multiple sources could identify gait, sleep, or 
exercise patterns that might help determine a change in a person’s behavior and alert to a 
possible problem. The participant was then asked if they were aware of any current or proposed 
legislation covering the use of biometric information on mobile devices, specifically apps that 
collect, store, and transmit protected health information. Neither respondent A-1 nor A-2 were 
aware of any such legislation in the works. 
     The third question was mapped to RQ1 and focused on the technology of the in-home health 
monitoring systems themselves. The participant was asked if they were aware of any current or 
proposed legislation governing the development and maintenance of the technology used (e.g., 
encryption, transmission standards, tamper alarms) of in-home health monitoring systems. 
Respondent A-1 was not aware of any such legislation in the works. Respondent A-2 was not 
aware of any such legislation in the works but pointed out that “existing California law does 
require reasonable security measures regarding medical information or that pertaining to 
physical characteristics. Further, this year the Legislature passed SB 327 requiring reasonable 
security features on connected devices.” 
     The fourth question was also mapped to RQ1 and focused on the privacy of the user’s data on 
the in-home health monitoring systems. The participants were asked if they were aware of any 
current or proposed legislation governing the privacy of users of mobile in-home health 
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monitoring systems. Respondent A-1 was not aware of any such legislation in the works. 
Respondent A-2 was not aware of any new legislation either but noted “California law is focuses 
on the nature of the data and its use, rather than the form of the device that collects or stores the 
data. Whether one’s personal information is stored on hard copy papers, in the cloud or in the 
memory of a mobile device shouldn’t impact the requirement of reasonable security measures, 
transparency of how information is used, the control someone should have to prevent sharing, 
and accountability for violations of those requirements.” 
     The fifth question was mapped to RQ3 and focused on in-home health monitoring systems as 
a whole. The participants were asked their opinion on whether or not in-home health monitoring 
systems as a whole were mature enough to warrant legislative attention or was it better to remain 
focused on the individual components. Respondent A-1 noted that legislating technology usually 
ends up raising the price and development time of the technology due to the additional 
requirements. This might end up doing more harm than good, since one of the main advantages 
of the in-home health monitoring system is that it can be deployed immediately using existing 
technology at no additional cost. Respondent A-2 acknowledged the concern for privacy such 
systems introduce and stated that legislation needs to take a proactive approach to consumer 
protection and information. The respondent notes “When it comes to regulating the security and 
privacy of these devices, we need to have a forward-looking approach that’s not limited to 
existing technologies. The regulatory approach needs to focus on the type of information, 
whether security measures are appropriate, and who is accessing the information. We can’t 
afford to wait for emerging technologies to come into the mainstream before we ensure 
consumers are properly informed and protected”. The respondent also cited the importance of 
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implementing and building upon the framework provided by the California Consumer Privacy 
Act [of 2018].  
 
Implications 
Practical Application 
The interview and survey feedback provide valuable insight into the possible problems 
legislators might face when attempting to regulate in-home health monitoring systems as a whole 
– that of effectively legislating these hybrid systems into a more proprietary solution, which 
would effectively defeat the purpose of a hybrid system.  
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Appendix D 
Informed Consent Form  
 
General Informed Consent Form 
NSU Consent to be in a Research Study Entitled 
Toward a unified framework of electronic Protected Health Information (e-PHI) privacy 
protection for seniors – An examination of privacy policy legislation within the United 
States for in-home health monitoring systems 
 
Who is doing this research study? 
 
College: College of Engineering and Computing 
   
 
Principal Investigator: Saganich, Robert Lee M.S. IST, B.S. CIS 
 
Faculty Advisor/Dissertation Chair: Cohen, Maxine Ph.D. 
 
Co-Investigator(s): None 
 
Site Information: N/A 
 
Funding: Unfunded 
 
What is this study about? 
 
This is a research study, designed to test and create new ideas that other people can 
use. The purpose of this research study is to provide a conceptual framework for states 
to use when developing legislation to protect the privacy of user data that is collected, 
stored, and transmitted by systems or applications developed by entities that are not 
covered under existing federal regulations (e.g., HIPAA). Unlike best practices, the 
legislation made possible by this work will enable the enforcement of privacy protections 
that protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the user's data. Also, the 
additional measures required by these laws will provide greater protection against fraud, 
identity theft, and other damaging consequences that occur because of a data breach. 
 
Why are you asking me to be in this research study? 
 
You are being asked to be in this research study to obtain clarification of facts or to 
obtain information about current and proposed privacy legislation not found in the public 
domain.  
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This study will include about five people. It is expected that one person will be from this 
location.  
 
What will I be doing if I agree to be in this research study? 
 
While you are taking part in this research study, there will be one interview of 
approximately 60 minutes.  
Research Study Procedures - as a participant, this is what you will be doing: 
 
This study focuses on state privacy legislation, so we are contacting members of the 
state privacy office, its equivalent, or state legislators as potential participants. We ask 
for approximately one hour of your time, depending on your schedule and the amount of 
information you wish to share.  
Are there possible risks and discomforts to me?  
 
This research study involves minimal risk to you. To the best of our knowledge, the 
things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you would have in everyday life.  
 
• Privacy risks – while we will take precautions to keep your information 
confidential, there is always a small risk of accidental disclosure. You will not be 
identified by name, location, or position on the recording or in handwritten notes 
taken during the interview. However, it is possible that your identity may be 
deduced based on your voice or references made to your state or office.  
• Legal risks – any disclosure that could result in legal risk will be deleted from the 
interview records. If we are recording, the recording will be deleted and the 
interview will be restarted. 
• Group or community risks – may arise in the event of accidental disclosure as 
mentioned under Privacy risks and/or Legal risks discussed above. 
 
What happens if I do not want to be in this research study?  
You have the right to leave this research study at any time, or not be in it. If you do 
decide to leave or you decide not to be in the study anymore, you will not get any 
penalty or lose any services you have a right to get. If you choose to stop being in the 
study, any information collected about you before the date you leave the study will be 
kept in the research records for 36 months from the conclusion of the study but you may 
request that it not be used. 
 
What if there is new information learned during the study that may affect my 
decision to remain in the study? 
If significant new information relating to the study becomes available, which may relate 
to whether you want to remain in this study, this information will be given to you by the 
investigators. You may be asked to sign a new Informed Consent Form, if the 
information is given to you after you have joined the study. 
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Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study?  
There are no direct benefits from being in this research study. We hope the information 
learned from this study will aid states in developing legislation to protect the privacy of 
user data that is collected, stored, and transmitted by systems or applications 
developed by entities that are not covered under existing federal regulations. 
 
Will I be paid or be given compensation for being in the study?  
 
You will not be given any payments or compensation for being in this research study. 
 
Will it cost me anything? 
 
There are no costs to you for being in this research study. 
How will you keep my information private? 
Information we learn about you in this research study will be handled in a confidential 
manner, within the limits of the law and will be limited to people who have a need to 
review this information. While we will take precautions to keep your information 
confidential, there is always a small risk of accidental disclosure. You will not be 
identified, but it is possible that your identity may be deduced based on your position 
and the state you work in. Our interview(s) will be recorded and transcribed only with 
your permission. This data will be available to the researcher, the Institutional Review 
Board and other representatives of this institution, and any regulatory and granting 
agencies (if applicable). If we publish the results of the study in a scientific journal or 
book, we will not identify you. All confidential data will be kept securely. Electronic 
records of our interview(s) will be encrypted, password protected, and stored on a 
portable drive in a locked cabinet, along with any handwritten notes, emails, or other 
documentation you provide us.  All data will be kept for 36 months and destroyed after 
that time by a professional shredding service and witnessed by the principal 
investigator. 
 
Will there be any Audio or Video Recording? 
With your permission, our interview(s) will be audio recorded and transcribed by the 
principal investigator. No identifying information (name, location, or position) will be 
recorded. A random, unique identifier will be generated to identify the interview and will 
be kept separate from the recording in the locked cabinet mentioned above. This 
recording will be available to the researcher, the Institutional Review Board and other 
representatives of this institution, and any regulatory and granting agencies (if 
applicable). The recording will be retained, stored, and destroyed as stated in the 
section above. 
 
Whom can I contact if I have questions, concerns, comments, or complaints? 
 
If you have questions now, feel free to ask us.  If you have more questions about the 
research, your research rights, or have a research-related injury, please contact: 
 
Primary contact: 
Saganich, Robert Lee M.S. IST, B.S. CIS can be reached at 703-216-1872 
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If primary is not available, contact: 
Cohen, Maxine Ph.D. can be reached at 954- 262- 2072 
 
Research Participants Rights 
For questions/concerns regarding your research rights, please contact: 
 
Institutional Review Board 
Nova Southeastern University 
(954) 262-5369 / Toll Free: 1-866-499-0790 
IRB@nova.edu 
 
You may also visit the NSU IRB website at www.nova.edu/irb/information-for-research-
participants for further information regarding your rights as a research participant. 
 
 
All space below was intentionally left blank. 
 
Voluntary Participation - You are not required to participate in this study.  In the event 
you do participate, you may leave this research study at any time.  If you leave this 
research study before it is completed, there will be no penalty to you, and you will not 
lose any benefits to which you are entitled. 
 
If you agree to participate in this research study, sign this section.  You will be given a 
signed copy of this form to keep.  You do not waive any of your legal rights by signing 
this form.   
 
SIGN THIS FORM ONLY IF THE STATEMENTS LISTED BELOW ARE TRUE: 
• You have read the above information. 
• Your questions have been answered to your satisfaction about the research. 
  
Adult Signature Section 
 
I have voluntarily decided to take part in this research study. 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
    
  
96 
Appendix E 
Participant Request Email  
 
From: Robert Saganich <rs1893@mynsu.nova.edu> 
Subject: Interview request for <legislator’s title and name> 
Date: <date and time autogenerated by mail client> 
To: <contact at legislator’s office> 
Cc: Robert Saganich <rs1893@mynsu.nova.edu> 
 
<Greeting>, 
 
The Capitol office gave me your contact info to send a request for phone interview to 
<legislator’s title and name>. My email to <him or her> is below. I appreciate any assistance you 
can provide. Thank you very much. 
 
Dear <legislator’s title and name>, 
  
     My name is Robert Saganich, and I am a doctoral student at Nova Southeastern University in 
Davie, Fl. I am writing my dissertation on the protection of electronic Protected Health 
Information gathered and stored on computer systems and mobile devices in California and 
Florida. Your work has proved invaluable to me in the areas of my research covering: < Select 
any topics from: aging in place; computer crimes; mobile devices and applications; personal 
information; policies, procedures, and standards; security breach notification; and web site 
policies that the legislator has worked on>. I would be grateful for the opportunity to interview 
you by telephone (preferably within the next two weeks) in support of my research. The 
interview won't exceed 30 minutes, and I am in Virginia on ET. I would appreciate your insight 
on the topics I listed above, as well as any policies or security requirements for applications 
gathering, storing, or forwarding personal identification or protected health information. 
  
     I have received Institutional Review Board approval for this study from the university. If you 
agree to the interview, I will send you an informed consent letter to review and sign beforehand. 
Dr. Maxine Cohen is my dissertation chair. You can reach her via email at cohenm@nova.edu or 
through the College of Engineering and Computing's website at https://cec.nova.edu/. Thank you 
so much for your time and for considering my request. I hope to hear back from you soon. 
  
Sincerely, 
Robert Saganich 
703-216-1872 
rs1893@mynsu.nova.edu  
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